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After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government renewed efforts to prepare for future 
attacks. Despite research on federal and state government preparedness, there was a lack 
of scholarship on trends in terrorist attacks at the local level. The purpose of this 
quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in terrorism attacks in the United 
States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether significance exists between 
characteristics of the terrorism incidents (weapon used, target type) and region. The 
conceptual framework included Grundmann’s risk management and Tomuzia et al.’s risk 
assessment scenario models. Answering the research questions entailed examining trends 
in terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 (number of incidents, 
injuries, fatalities), including relationships by region, weapon used, and target type. 
Secondary data from the Global Terrorism Database underwent analysis using ARIMA 
models for time-series data and chi-square and post hoc analyses for categorical level 
data. There was an examination of type of weapon used and target type for differences 
between regions. Findings revealed that trends in terrorist attacks for injuries did not 
differ across time; however, trends in terrorist attacks for fatalities decreased over time. 
Changes in terrorist attacks by region were significantly related to weapon used and 
target type. Findings may lead to positive social change by helping policymakers 
understand future targets and characteristics of terrorist attacks, potentially improving 
preparedness and thereby reducing injuries and death. Future research is needed to 
confirm and expand the findings, including studies on terrorist attacks against the United 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
With the ever-increasing rate of globalization in the 21st century, a tremendous 
number of people have moved to urban areas, creating densely populated cities. Although 
this growth of urban areas is worthy of celebration, recent history shows that the urban 
population lives amid an ever-present threat of terrorism (Clarke & Moghadam, 2018). 
According to Taylor (2019), terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or force against 
property or person to coerce or intimidate the civilian population, the government, or any 
other entity to advance a social goal or further a political agenda. Some notable terrorist 
actions include the 9/11 attack in the United States, the July 7, 2005, attack in London, 
the Paris attack of 2015, and the Mumbai attacks of 2008 (Lowry, 2018). These attacks 
indicate that many cities globally are at the risk of the ever-growing and evolving threat 
of terrorism. 
Since the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has maintained 
a greater focus on preventing and stopping all forms of terrorism. Although there were 
terrorist attacks prior to 2001, including some as early as the 1980s against members of 
an Indian reserve and the LaGuardia Airport Bombing in 1975, the nature, scale, and 
societal impacts stemming from terrorism have dramatically changed since then (Lowry, 
2018). Changes include the development of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Understanding the trends and 
methods used in terrorist attacks in the United States could better empower authorities to 
prevent terrorists from succeeding. 
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The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. The importance of 
understanding the trends in terrorism attacks in the United States pertained to the need to 
be prepared to respond to potential attacks. Preparation at a regional level is especially 
important to gain public trust and confidence and to ensure the safety of everyone. 
Preparation for future terrorism events is necessary for every major city and region. The 
results of this study may be useful for regional leaders to reexamine their preparedness 
for terrorist attacks and what they need to do to combat terrorism effectively, particularly 
for regions that have had terrorist attacks since 2001.  
This research was a descriptive quantitative study to examine trends in terrorism 
attacks, including the number of incidents, weapon used, fatalities, injuries, and target 
type. Also examined were the differences in these variables based on the region in which 
the terrorist incident took place. This chapter presents the background and statement of 
the problem, purpose of the study, and guiding research questions and hypotheses. 
Further, in this chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework, nature of the study, 
definitions of terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance 
of the study. 
Background 
Before September 11, 2001, the threat of a terrorist attack was considered 
unlikely; however, attention to terrorist attacks grew during the anthrax incident in the 
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United States that followed the attack (SteelFisher et al., 2012; Sun & Yang, 2017). The 
creation of the DHS was a means of keeping the country safe from future terror attacks. 
The TSA aimed to protect airports and other modes of widescale public transportation. 
The emergence of the Health Protection Agency following several outbreaks of new 
infectious diseases provided a new organizational umbrella for addressing preparedness 
for a terrorist attack. The tactic of terrorism also calls for generating as much fear in the 
population as possible (Kar et al., 2012). The threat of terrorism itself can be unnerving. 
Therefore, although terrorism ranks as a low-risk danger, its characteristics make it a 
source of ongoing worry and concern.  
In the United States, the threat of terrorism remains despite the measures adopted 
to address the surging cases of domestic terrorism (Taylor, 2019). Some of these 
measures include the enactment of counterterrorism legislative acts and proactive law 
enforcement initiatives. Clarke and Moghadam (2018) affirmed that with the growing 
incidences of religious intolerance, terrorist-related acts in the United States increased 
steadily from 2014 to 2019. Although the majority of these acts have links to domestic 
terrorism, the United States still faces notable challenges from international terrorists. 
Zulli et al. l. (2021) classified the international terrorists facing the United States into 
three groups: formalized terrorist organizations, radical international jihad movement, 
and state sponsors of terrorism. Taylor (2019) identified two groups of domestic 
terrorists: the right and left wings. According to Clarke and Moghadam, addressing the 
international and domestic terror threats in the United States will require collaborative 
and innovative initiatives anchored on coordination and preparedness at all levels.  
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Preparedness is a comprehensive concept, including issues such as 
communication, infrastructure, education, and response (Arrazola et al., 2018; Manuell & 
Cukor, 2010; Poutanen, 2007; Smith & Davison, 2010; Waterer & Robertson, 2009). 
Public compliance is also a key issue (Manuell & Cukor, 2010). Public compliance refers 
to a person’s public expression and change in behaviors related to a group or public 
pressure. For example, if government leaders order an evacuation due to a perceived 
disaster, people might choose not to evacuate based on the individuals around them. If 
they cannot get off of work or their family thinks complying with the evacuation order is 
not the right move, people could go against what is accurate and make the wrong 
decisions. 
In acts of terrorism, lockdown and evacuation are two critical tools of response, 
and compliance with either mandate is crucial. Arguing that specific stakeholder 
perception of preparedness is important, Jacobson et al. (2010) surveyed nurses in North 
Texas regarding their sense of preparedness for a terrorist attack. Less than 10% of 
participants felt they were prepared, although 30% expressed willingness to collaborate 
with state and federal agencies in responding to an event. Also, 69% reported a need for 
more training to consider themselves prepared for such an event. A simulation-based 
training process would likely improve nurses’ sense of preparedness (Morrison & 
Catanzaro, 2010). Katz et al. (2006), however, found that due to funding constraints, 
inadequate surge capacity, and workforce shortages in public health, most hospitals still 




The problem addressed in this study was that local officials were only modestly 
confident in their local communities’ and governments’ preparation to adequately 
respond to a terrorist event based on analysis of multiple factors (Brandeau, 2019; David 
& Le Dévédec, 2018; Scott & Errett, 2018; Welby-Everard et al., 2020). A primary 
paradigm to formulate a plan to respond to a terrorism incident is the concept of 
preparedness. Preparedness involves forecasting and taking precautionary measures 
before an imminent threat when warnings are possible (United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction, n.d.). Previous research shows the public was poorly 
prepared for terrorism; also, many in the health care and public health communities were 
relatively unprepared both in knowledge and capacity to respond effectively to a terrorist 
attack (Eto & Kanatani, 2018; Funk, 2018). Despite research on state government 
preparedness for potential terrorist attacks (Grundmann, 2014), there is a lack of 
scholarship on the trends in terrorist attacks at the local level. 
Although terrorism has alarming consequences, some fail to take the threat of 
terrorism seriously. Many stakeholders do not think themselves susceptible to the threat, 
with establishing preparedness for such a minimal threat often viewed as too expensive or 
involved (Green et al., 2019; Tournier et al., 2019). In a resource-constrained 
environment, the level of preparedness depends not only on its potential impact but also 
on its likelihood of occurrence (Banerjee et al., 2017; Ryan, 2016). This was particularly 
true at the local, or city and community, level, where officials often find themselves 
caught between funding problems and a need for preparedness; as a result, they do not 
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exhibit a high degree of preparedness for terrorism (Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). As such, 
this study mainly focused on trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 and how 
these trends differ by region.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance exists between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. Understanding 
surveillance, early detection, effective evacuations, control of the movement of involved 
individuals, and risk communication is essential for improving preparedness for terror 
attacks and may help to improve preparedness for natural disasters (Green et al., 2019). 
The importance of understanding the trends in terrorism attacks in the United States 
pertains to the need to be prepared to respond to potential terrorist attacks. The secondary 
data used in this quantitative study came from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
Descriptive statistics included frequency counts and time-series analysis, which I used to 
determine the trends in terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018, 
including trends by region in the number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities. I used 
multinomial logit analysis to determine the relationships between the region of the 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the attack (weapon used and target type).  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 




RQ1: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States?  
H01: There were no changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. 
Ha1: There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. 
RQ2: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States by region? 
H02: There were no changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States by region. 
Ha2: There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States by region. 
RQ3: What was the relationship between the region of the terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type)? 
H03: There was no statistically significant relationship between the region of 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor 
variables: weapon used and target type). 
Ha3: There was a statistically significant relationship between the region of 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor 
variables: weapon used and target type) for one or more regions and one or more 




Conceptual frameworks are useful for providing an illustrative representation and 
can be diagrammatic or descriptive (Rathert et al., 2012; Robson, 2002). The two models 
in this study’s conceptual framework were the flowchart for major areas of concern 
connected to bioterrorist attacks developed by Grundmann (2014) and the flowchart of 
categories used to assess risk related to a terrorism scenario developed by Tomuzia et al. 
(2013). In adapting Grundmann’s model to this study, I removed the elements related to 
decontamination and pre- and postexposure prophylaxis.  
As shown in Figure 1, the model for the major areas of concern connected to a 
terrorist threat was appropriate for this study because it incorporates the aspects of risk 
assessment, risk management, and risk communication involved in addressing a terrorist 
threat (Grundmann, 2014). Grundmann (2014) identified a need for additional research in 
each area to improve responses to terrorism threats. For the study, Grundmann’s model 
was useful in understanding how the areas of risk assessment, explored in the study’s 
data analysis, could be connected to areas of risk management, such as preparedness, to 




Major Areas of Concern Connected to a Terrorist Threat 
 
Note. Copyright 2014 by Dove Medical Press. Adapted with permission. 
There are many areas of concern related to terrorist threats, such as monitoring 
and identifying potential terrorist attacks, preventing attacks, and managing the response 
plans for the attacks that do occur. These processes can be time-consuming and 
expensive, preventing certain regions from having the same access to threat management 
as others. Some regions might have other areas of concern when it comes to managing a 
potential terrorist attack. For example, securing cities with important national or 




Nature of the Study 
A quantitative method was appropriate in this study as it aligned with the purpose 
of this study, which was to examine trends in terrorist attacks in the United States 
between 2001 and 2018 and investigate whether factors related to terrorist attacks vary by 
region. This was a descriptive quantitative study. The purpose of descriptive quantitative 
research is to describe and interpret the status of individuals, settings, conditions, or 
events (Mertler, 2014, 2016). In this study, I examined and interpreted the status of 
terrorist incidents in the United States from 2001 to 2018 as reported in GTD. To answer 
RQ1 and RQ2, I used descriptive statistics, including frequency counts and time-series 
charts, to examine the trends in the number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities associated 
with terrorist incidents between 2001 and 2018, as well as trends in the regions in which 
the terrorist incidents occurred. To answer RQ3, I used a multinomial logit model. The 
multinomial logistic model was appropriate because it assumes that the data are case-
specific and is thus useful with nominal variables (Long, 2014; Rodriguez, 2007). For 
RQ3, the independent/predictor variables examined against the dependent variable of 
region were the weapon used and target type of the terrorist incident. 
Because I used historical secondary data to analyze previous terrorist attacks, the 
data were case-specific by each terrorist attack, also referred to as a terrorist incident. I 
used secondary data obtained from the GTD. I used descriptive statistics, including 
frequency counts and time-series analysis, to determine the trends in terrorist attacks in 
the United States between 2001 and 2018, including trends by region in the number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities. Multinomial logit analysis allowed me to determine the 
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relationships between the region of the terrorist attack and the characteristics of the attack 
(weapon used and target type). There were no human subjects used in this study. The 
subject was terrorism incidents, also known as terrorist attacks, in the United States 
between 2001 and 2018. All terrorism incidents occurring between 2001 and 2018 in the 
United States and recorded in the GTD merited inclusion in this study. 
Definitions 
Bioterrorism. The deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) 
used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants (Tegos, 2013). 
Man-made disasters. A disastrous event caused directly and principally by one or 
more identifiable deliberate or negligent human actions (Bilala & Galamas, 2015). 
Preparedness. The extent to which the education of the public has become a part 
of preparedness and the extent to which the community itself is aware or prepared for a 
terrorist event (Pinto, 2013). 
Terrorism. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political, or 
social objectives” (General Functions, 1965, para. i). 
Assumptions 
Because of the use of secondary data, the central assumption was that the data 
from GTD were accurate and represented the terrorist attacks in the United States 
between 2001 and 2018. The second assumption was that each terrorist attack in the 
United States between 2001 and 2018 was an independent event. This assumption was 
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important for the assumption in the analysis that the data on each incident were case-
specific. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The focus of this study was terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States 
between 2001 and 2018 and were reported in the GTD. The findings reflected trends in 
terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018, including region-level data. 
Being prepared at the regional level is especially important to gain public trust and 
confidence. Therefore, a region-level focus was appropriate in this study to determine 
whether there were differences in the characteristics of the terrorist attack (weapon used 
and target type). This study also concerned what influences the region’s preparedness and 
how federal, state, and local resources can help. As such, the scope of this study primarily 
revolved around the man-made disaster of a terrorist attack. Excluded from this study 
were man-made disasters not considered as acts of terrorism.  
Limitations 
One limitation of this study was the use of secondary data, as the findings were 
limited to the data included in the GTD. The study’s findings were also limited to 
terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018. Therefore, the results are 
not generalizable to other countries.  
Significance 
Based on the review of literature, the public is ill-prepared for such an event. 
Citizens are poorly educated in terms of preparedness. Even the health care and first 
responder communities are unprepared in both knowledge and capacity to respond 
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effectively to a terrorist attack. Further, the research showed that many stakeholders do 
not think themselves susceptible to the threat. Many perceive establishing preparedness 
for such a minimal threat as too expensive, having a low sense of self-efficacy in 
administering or carrying out a plan. According to the literature, these beliefs are 
particularly true at the city and community levels. Local officials struggle between 
funding problems and a need for preparedness and thus do not exhibit a high degree of 
preparedness for terrorism (Alba & Gable, 2011; Choi, 2009; Roof & Oleru, 2008). 
Accordingly, this study is of significance, as it provided evidence of trends in terrorism 
and may be useful in helping regions prepare for future attacks by understanding trends in 
such incidents in the United States between 2001 and 2018. The study was also helpful in 
determining whether there were trends in the characteristics of terrorism incidents based 
on the region in which they occurred between 2001 and 2018, showing whether 
identifying specific predictive measures could improve preparedness for future attacks.  
Summary 
The problem addressed in this study was that local officials were only modestly 
confident of their local communities and governments being prepared to adequately 
respond to a terrorist event and that there were many reasons for the gaps between ideal 
and current state of preparedness (Bush & Perez, 2012; Sun & Yang, 2017). As such, the 
purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in terrorism attacks 
in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any statistical 
significance exists between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents (weapon used 
and target type) and the region in which they occurred. Understanding surveillance, early 
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detection, effective isolation of terrorists, control of the movement of involved 
individuals, and risk communication is essential for improving preparedness for terrorist 
attacks. Awareness could also help to improve preparedness for natural disasters (Green 
et al., 2019). I analyzed secondary data from the GTD using descriptive statistics and 
multinomial logit analysis. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature regarding 
terrorism and region-level medical preparedness for countering terrorist attacks.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The problem addressed in this study was that local officials were only modestly 
confident of their local communities’ and governments’ preparation to adequately 
respond to a terrorist event based on analysis of multiple factors (Brandeau, 2019; David 
& Le Dévédec, 2018; Scott & Errett, 2018; Welby-Everard et al., 2020). A primary 
paradigm utilized to formulate a plan to respond to a terrorism incident is the concept of 
preparedness. Preparedness involves forecasting and taking precautionary measures prior 
to an imminent threat when advance warnings are possible (United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction, n.d.). Previous research shows that the public is poorly 
prepared for terrorism. Many corners of the community are relatively unprepared in both 
knowledge and capacity to respond effectively to a terrorist attack (Eto & Kanatani, 
2018; Funk, 2018). There is also a lack of research on the trends in terrorist attacks based 
on the region of attack. This gap is particularly apparent at the local, or city and 
community, level, where local officials are caught between funding problems and a need 
for preparedness and do not exhibit a high degree of terrorism preparedness as a result 
(Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). Thus, new region-specific research is necessary to provide 
key stakeholders with the knowledge to make effective evidence-based decisions about 
terrorism preparedness. I focused this study particularly on trends in terrorist attacks 
between 2001 and 2018 and how these trends differ by region.  
Literature Search Strategy 
The reviewed literature review emerged from a search of the following EBSCO 
databases: Academic Search Premier, MasterFILE Premier, Business Source Premier, 
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ERIC, Communication & Mass Media Complete, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences 
Collection, PsycINFO, and PsycARTICLES. To find relevant research for this review, I 
searched key terms and phrases, such as terrorism, preparedness, preparation, disaster 
preparedness, disaster response, terrorism preparedness, terrorism attacks, local 
government, and local officials. Despite some seminal and theoretical works cited to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the topic, most of the reviewed research was 
published within the past 5 years to ensure relevance. 
In the review, I examine the extent to which local officials perceived that they 
were prepared to respond adequately to a terrorist incident in their communities (Bush & 
Perez, 2012; Sun & Yang, 2017). I first provide insight into how the theoretical 
framework will guide addressing the research questions. Subsequently, I examine the 
threat of terrorism in the United States. The concept of preparedness forms the major 
paradigm in response to an event; accordingly, I reviewed studies of the general 
preparedness of the United States on federal, state, and local levels. This entailed 
examining the concept of preparedness, the extent to which educating the public has 
become a part of preparedness, and the degree to which the health care community is 
aware of or prepared for a terrorist event. 
In this chapter, I review various types of preparedness, including terrorism 
surveillance systems, emergency plans, security, and the extent to which the public health 
and military infrastructures need to overlap and collaborate to respond adequately to a 
terrorist attack. I also appraise the validity of the health belief theory and models of 
public health, as they might be useful to gain a better sense of the accuracy of 
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stakeholders’ perceptions of preparedness. I then examine several case studies of 
localities undertaking preparedness plans for emergencies in general and terrorism 
specifically to determine their effectiveness. The review closes with studies about the 
perceptions of local stakeholders, especially local government officials, on the state of 
preparedness for a terrorist attack in their communities. I discuss research on 
stakeholders’ perceptions of how well their community is prepared for such an event, 
finding that many gaps remain in preparedness for terrorism at the local or regional level.  
Conceptual Framework 
The two models I used for the conceptual framework in this study were the 
flowchart for major areas of concern connected to a terrorism threat developed by 
Grundmann (2014) and the flowchart of categories used to assess risk related to a 
terrorism scenario developed by Tomuzia et al. (2013; see Figure 1). I selected the model 
for the major areas of concern connected to a terrorism threat for the study because it 
incorporates the aspects of risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication 
involved in addressing a terrorism threat (Grundmann, 2014). Grundmann identified a 
need for additional research in each area to improve preparedness and response to 
terrorism threats, developing a framework to demonstrate the complexity of addressing 
potential terrorist threats.  
Grundmann’s (2014) model was useful in understanding how the areas of risk 
assessment, explored in the data analysis of the study, connect to areas of risk 
management, such as preparedness, to improve the response to terrorism threats on a 
regional level. Specifically, the problem addressed was preparedness for potential 
18 
 
terrorist attacks, particularly given that the ability to prevent such attacks is limited (Pal 
et al., 2017). With Grundmann’s (2014) model, preparedness is within the category of 
risk management along with prevention. I examined the status of terrorist threats between 
2001 and 2018 by analyzing terrorism incidents in this period. In accordance with 
Grundmann’s (2014) model, I focused on risk assessment by analyzing aspects of 
monitoring and surveillance, as tracked in the GTD. Grundmann was also relevant for the 
study because, as reflected in Figure 2, I incorporated the federal, state, regional, and 
local considerations in addressing a potential terrorist attack. The conceptualization of the 
different levels of agency response and preparedness for a potential terrorist attack was 
important, as the focus of this study was on preparedness at the regional level (which 
Grundmann considers the local level). As shown in Figure 2, Grundmann’s model 





Federal, State, Regional, and Local Agency Involvement in a Potential Terrorist Attack 
 
Note. Copyright 2014 by Dove Medical Press. Reproduced with permission. 
Review of the Literature 
The analysis of terrorism must begin by defining what terrorism is. Given its long 
and complicated history, terrorism is difficult to define. One of the frustrating things 
about studying terrorism is the openness of the definition to include a large number of 
possible events (Simeon, 2019). “What is terrorism?” is a question often asked by the 
media, politicians, educators, and others who are interested in preventing terror attacks on 
U.S. soil (Lowry, 2018). Sometimes, this question emerges as if terrorism were a 
scientific study with a single definition. Although terrorism can be vague and broad, it is 
easily recognized by people who perceive it as a “know it when you see it” type of 
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phenomenon (Zulli et al., 2021). Still, a general definition can be helpful in 
understanding what terrorism is and how it affects people.  
Terrorism is the use of violence and the intimidation of civilians in the pursuit of 
political ends (Clarke & Moghadam, 2018). According to Saul (2006), terrorism is 
“extreme fear” (p. 34). There are many disagreements as to what constitutes terrorism. Is 
it only crimes against innocent civilians? What happens if one side deems the other as 
needing to be punished or guilty? Internationally, terrorism is defined as “criminal 
violence intended to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international 
organization; some national laws add an ulterior intention to pursue a political, religious, 
or ideological cause” (Saul, 2006, p. 36). 
The use of terror is not new. In World War II, terrorism was one of the weapons 
of mass destruction. Because the definition of terrorism can encompass many different 
events, an analysis of terrorism is complicated (Lowry, 2018). There is no single defining 
element that qualifies an event as terrorism. For example, a group of armed gunmen 
occupying and robbing a bank can intimidate civilians but not be terrorists because there 
is no plot to influence politics (Simeon, 2019). However, that same group of gunmen in 
an airport where a diplomat landed and is taken hostage indicates a clear case of 
terrorism. In other cases, acts of violence, such as bombings of public places, have no 
political motivations but manage to terrify the public and are considered terrorism (Huff 
& Kertzer, 2018). This confusion over what constitutes terrorism stems from the practical 
application of the label terrorism to describe different events that might not fit the strict 
definition but are widely accepted as such.  
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The Rise in Terrorism 
Terrorism has existed in one form or another for centuries, something not clearly 
evident from the current views on terrorism. Many regard the beginning of terrorism as 
the September 11, 2011, World Trade Center attacks; however, 9/11 was just the 
beginning of the modern age of terrorism (Jones et al., 2020). This single attack 
significantly reshaped the act of terrorism and its reception by communities around the 
world, placing terrorism at the forefront of the world’s consciousness, where it had little 
consideration before 2001 (Clarke & Moghadam, 2018). The United States, for example, 
had not seen a major terrorist attack that affected the entire country in such a way in 
decades (Lowry, 2018). September 11 changed that, making terrorism a threat of which 
every American was aware and in some way affected.  
Considered the beginning of the modern age of terrorism, the 9/11 attacks 
signaled a significant and persistent rise in terrorism over the following decades (Taylor, 
2019). Traditional Western powers, such as the United Kingdom, saw a significant 
increase in terrorism as groups saw they could inflict pain and fear on the countries 
against which they held vendettas (Jones et al., 2020). It is important to note that much, if 
not most, of this rise has been from homegrown terrorists who are largely disgruntled 
citizens of the country they attack. This is in stark contrast to the view that Middle 
Eastern countries are sending terrorists to Western countries to attack civilians and 
government organizations (Simeon, 2019). Countries are, in essence, creating their own 
terrorists that attack from within.  
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Despite a surge in terrorist attacks after 9/11, that trend slowly decreased over 
time. There are fewer attacks on average per day today than in the years after 9/11 (Jones, 
2018). Statistical data may not show the full extent of how this change has occurred. 
Efforts by multiple countries receive credit for the decrease, but they do not fully explain 
the downward trend (Jones et al., 2020). Still, terrorism continues to be a significant issue 
in parts of the world and is an ever-constant threat everywhere. Efforts to curtail 
terrorism have profoundly affected how people live their lives, despite the decrease. 
These security measures are still in place and contribute to significant changes in 
industries and how countries relate to each other (Taylor, 2019). Military action has 
undoubtedly stressed relationships between countries, which may prove permanent or 
take a very long time to correct.  
Understanding Terrorism in the United States 
It is important to note that although terrorism has declined, the number of 
terrorism-like events has increased. Statistics fail to indicate what terrorism is globally or, 
in particular, in the United States (Lowry, 2018). It could be that the number of deaths 
from carjacking has gone up, but without catching the perpetrators, the number of dead 
victims from being hit by a vehicle has gone down. Likewise, it could be that the number 
of public shootings has gone up, but without apprehending the shooters, the number of 
dead victims from such shootings has gone down (Jones, 2018). Thus, it is impossible to 
infer trends from these statistics.  
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Differentiating Between Domestic and International Terrorism in the United States 
In the United States, there is both international and domestic terrorism. Since 
9/11, there is a perception of most terrorism as international, where foreign actors from 
other countries come onto American soil and commit crimes against civilians, such as the 
attack on the World Trade Center (Zulli et al., 2021)—in this case, Muslim terrorists 
from the Middle East. However, this is not the only type of terrorism in America. 
Domestic terrorists, such as those taking part in the insurrection against the U.S. Capitol 
on January 6, 2021 (Taylor, 2019), are forces of terrorism from within a nation; other 
examples include a mass shooting in a public space by a citizen (Huff & Kertzer, 2018). 
In the United States, known domestic terrorist groups include the Ku Klux Klan, United 
Freedom Front, and Aryan Nations (Lowry, 2018). However, an individual does not need 
to be a part of an identified group to be a terrorist. 
As the number of mass shootings in the United States has risen dramatically, the 
vague definition of terrorism makes it challenging to determine incident type. Many of 
these shootings have the same circumstances as terrorist events but without the terrorism 
label for various reasons (Taylor, 2019). Race is a significant factor in the labeling of 
events, with non-White perpetrators deemed terrorists and White perpetrators rarely so 
(Jones, 2018). There is a bias about terrorism that involves the concept of domestic or 
White terrorism, where the public is more likely to label an event as a disturbed 
individual’s call for help instead of domestic terrorism (Felthous, 2014).  
The National Security Agency (NSA) provides comprehensive data to understand 
terrorism in the United States ( Lansford, 2018). The NSA monitors and intercepts the 
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communications of international terrorist organizations and other suspicious activities 
that are not of intelligence interest to the U.S. government (Simeon, 2019). The 1970s 
saw the advent of organized crime in the United States, accompanied by a significant 
increase in terrorism. In addition, that decade’s economic boom led to an increase in real 
estate crimes, which increased property crimes (Taylor, 2019). 
History of Terrorism in the United States 
The history of terrorism in the United States is interesting. Many people are 
confused about the events that transpired during those years because of inadequate 
information (Jones, 2018). When such events occurred, citizens suffered from what the 
country deemed “soft terrorism”—meaning political and social unrest—which was much 
less harmful than the hard terrorism carried out by al Qaeda and the Taliban (Lansford, 
2018). Soft terrorism, then and now, encompassed a wide variety of events. In some 
cases, even civil rights actions that disrupted society received the label of terrorist 
actions. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. leaders began to use the phrase “hard terrorism” 
(Jones, 2018) to describe incidents such as the anthrax attacks in New York and the 
attempted attacks on the U.S. homeland using airplanes. Other acts of terrorism in the 
United States include: 
• Shooting at the Pentagon in 2010  
• Suicide attacks on the Internal Revenue Service building in Austin in 2010 
• Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016 
• Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election  
• Attack on Ohio State University in 2016 
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• Shooting of Republican Congressman at a baseball game in 2017 
• Tree of Life Synagogue shooting (Chaliand, 2019). 
There has also been a rise in cyberterrorism, or acts terrorism involving the 
internet, computers, and online resources (Ahmed, 2018; Lansford, 2018). 
Cyberterrorism has become a significant concern over the past decade, responsible for 
many major world events. One of the most notable examples is accusations of 
cyberterrorism and tampering during the 2016 U.S. elections by Russia (Chaliand, 2019). 
Other instances include major data breaches for international companies and 
organizations, direct interference in the operation of power grids from other countries, 
and the escalation of space-based systems interference (Huff & Kertzer, 2018). 
Terrorism Preparedness in the United States 
There has been significant talk about terrorism preparedness within the United 
States. With many politicians and citizens asserting that the United States is close to 
danger, it is easy to see how serious this issue has become. The reality is, no one is safe 
from terrorism anywhere in the world (Malmin, 2020). There are always sleeper cells, 
international terrorists, and rogue nation-states determined to harm innocent life. Because 
of this, terrorism preparedness must be an immediate concern for every American citizen 
(Romano et al., 2019). The objective has expanded from protecting the American people 
from random attacks to ensuring the country’s safety from terrorist groups (Chaliand, 
2019). When a nation is on high alert for any activity from external sources, there are 
high expectations for law enforcement to stop any potential terrorist attacks.  
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Organizations at all levels participate in terrorism and mass casualty training. 
There are many types of terrorism, including natural disasters and civil unrest. For 
instance, terrorist groups often set off large-scale attacks in large cities like Los Angeles 
or New York (Ahmed, 2018). The fear in these areas is great enough that the police and 
law enforcement community are on high alert. Law enforcement agencies provide both 
specific terrorism training and general terrorism training in dealing with a wide variety of 
threats. Among the training available to law enforcement personnel is how to respond to 
dangerous situations (Malmin, 2020), which includes notifying residents about a 
dangerous situation and location and safely evacuating the area.  
The final piece of terrorism preparedness is dealing with terrorist acts themselves. 
Unfortunately, local resources to help with this type of training are limited (Chaliand, 
2019). Although most police departments have some available terrorism information and 
training manuals, they usually reserve these for classified situations (Malmin, 2020). A 
bomb squad will also likely be on hand, but they usually work on terrorism cases only. 
Thus, there is insufficient preparedness for the average citizen (Hojman et al., 2019). 
Local and regional governments must rely on national and international agencies for help.  
The general public needs to know how to respond if they see something 
suspicious or are involved in a terrorist attack themselves. Fortunately, there is a large 
terrorism preparedness industry that strives to provide this sort of education for the 
general public (Malmin, 2020). Various websites offer terrorism training and how-to 




Terrorism Response in the United States 
In response to heightened threats of terrorism, countries worldwide adjusted their 
policies and practices to prepare for, resist, and respond to terrorist activity. The United 
States’s response to terrorism has been controversial at best, as it is not clear how 
successful the changes have been (Hojman et al., 2019). The U.S. response to terrorism 
has been two-fold, with an international strategy and a domestic strategy. The 
international strategy incorporated more intensive military, espionage, and 
counterterrorism operations overseas; examples include sending forces to Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Somalia to find and punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Huff & 
Kertzer, 2018). The United States now has a pronounced counterterrorism posture with 
collaboration from partner countries around the world.  
The domestic strategy has proven to be even more controversial and involves the 
NSA. The NSA has access to many of the data routes and systems that people use to 
conduct business and in their daily lives (Chaliand, 2019). Despite well-established 
protections from unwarranted observations specified by U.S. law, the NSA began 
covertly collecting data about U.S. citizens without their knowledge (Zulli et al., 2021). 
While the practice was controversial, it contributed to identifying several domestic 
terrorists and their support networks. Domestic terrorism increased after 9/11 and 
continues to be a significant problem. These terrorist attacks take the form of mass 
shootings perpetrated by one or two gunmen (Hojman et al., 2019). While the media and 
some in law enforcement resist labeling these events domestic terrorism, many acts 
indicate political and societal motivations. Today in the United States, more domestic 
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terrorist groups are preying on the public and security (Hojman et al., 2019). Some plot 
attacks against civilian populations, whereas others have vaguely malicious reasons. The 
United States has systems in place to identify and stop these cells. Still, many agree that 
the increasing number of domestic terrorists is a significant problem that could 
circumvent the established policies and practices.  
Types of Terrorist Attacks 
Terrorism has become an increasingly relevant threat used to justify many 
governmental policies, military actions, and acts of aggression (Romano et al., 2019). 
Terrorism has been defined as the illegal use of violence or force against persons or 
property intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian population into compliance with a 
government or its representatives (Ahmed, 2018). The law of terrorism has many gray 
areas. For instance, it can be unclear which acts constitute terrorist activity and which do 
not (Romano et al., 2019). Many factors are difficult to define or agree upon, such as the 
motivation of a public official for conducting a terror attack and whether certain acts are 
legal or classified as military operations (Ahmed, 2018). Acts of terrorism include 
bombings of civilians or buildings, suicide bombers and other attacks, explosives, 
vehicular attacks, chemical weapons, nuclear attacks, cyberterrorism, mass shootings, 
stabbings, and bioterrorism. 
Acts of terrorism occur when an individual or group of individuals use violence or 
the threat of violence to gain political power. When multiple shooters attack a key 
facility, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) consults a terrorism watch list to 
uncover coordination between the shooters and anyone else involved in the attack 
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(Ahmed, 2018). The watch list helps government officials identify the perpetrators and 
those who may have assisted them (Romano et al., 2019). If a key facility undergoes 
repeated terrorist attacks, then the U.S. government begins to look for ways to prevent 
future attacks. They often rely on watch lists to find individuals and groups engaging in 
such activities. 
Other types of suspicious activity could also signal that someone is engaging in 
terrorist activity. Such suspicious activities include changing vehicles, traveling from 
location to location, and purchasing large amounts of weapons and equipment (Romano 
et al., 2019). Buying vast quantities of expensive items could signal that they are funding 
or receiving help from terrorist groups (Hojman et al., 2019). On the other hand, if 
someone travels from location to location frequently, this could be a sign of their being a 
courier and not a terrorist (Zulli et al., 2021). Either way, suspicious activity is an 
important consideration to prevent terror attacks on U.S. soil. 
U.S. targets have been the victim of terrorist acts many times. The 1995 
Oklahoma City Bombing was an act of terrorism, as was the incident at the IRS building 
in Austin, Texas, that same year (Zulli et al., 2021). However, the reality is that most 
cases of terrorism are the acts of multiple individuals who may have various motives 
(Hojman et al., 2019). Therefore, determining if an individual is a terrorist requires the 
investigation of multiple acts of this nature and the procurement of concrete evidence 
against an individual. 
Another type of terrorism involves the use of violence or malicious destruction of 
property. However, determining the motive can be extremely difficult to determine 
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(Simeon, 2019). Some individuals believe they are seeking retribution when they are 
actually planning to commit an act of terrorism (Hojman et al., 2019). Therefore, it is 
essential to watch all videos that seem planned for a terrorist act. Other types of terrorism 
include planting bombs near places of worship, sending viruses through email, and public 
violence, such as an attack on civilians. 
Bioterrorism 
Bioterrorism is the intentional release of a biological toxin into the environment to 
cause death (Casadevall, 2012; Tegos, 2013). Bioterrorism is a form of terrorism 
involving the intentional release or dissemination of biological agents such as bacteria, 
viruses, or toxins in either a naturally occurring or a human-modified form to incapacitate 
or kill humans, plants, and animals, which then can lead to biological warfare 
(Casadevall, 2012; Tegos, 2013). In other words, bioterrorism is the use of 
microorganisms or infected samples to cause terror and panic and is a form of terrorism 
that is centuries old (Barras & Greub, 2014). There are more than 180 pathogens 
identified as possible agents of bioterrorism, all easily disguised and transported from one 
place to another without detection (Bezek et al., 2020). Biosafety and biosecurity have 
emerged with the increased recognition of bioterrorism as a threat (Pal et al., 2017). 
Bioterrorism is one of the world’s most feared forms of terrorism after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the discovery of human anthrax cases and 
exposures several weeks later (Greub & Grobusch, 2014; Jansen et al., 2014). 
Government agencies specializing in public health, national defense, security, and public 
relations have created research teams and collaborated to ensure the safety and 
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preparedness of their communities when bioterrorism occurs again (Bilala & Galamas, 
2015; Pinto, 2013). The concepts of medical preparedness, the extent to which public 
education has become a part of preparedness, and the extent to which the health care 
community is aware or prepared for a bioterrorist event are paramount in every 
community (Pinto, 2013; Tegos, 2013). 
The Threat of Bioterrorism in the United States 
Before September 11, 2001, the threat of a bioterrorist attack in the United States 
appeared unlikely. A rare attack in the United States occurred in 1984 with salad bars in 
The Dalles, Oregon, contaminated with salmonella (Grundmann, 2014; Pal et al., 2017). 
Despite the small number of bioterrorism incidents in the United States before the 21st 
century, countries have engaged in bioterrorism for hundreds of years, with accounts 
dating back to the 14th century (Pal et al., 2017). Perceptions of the likelihood of a 
bioterrorist attack changed during the anthrax incident in the United States, quickly 
following 9/11 (Sun & Yang, 2017). The distribution of letters containing anthrax to 
media organizations and politicians was a clear incident of bioterrorism (Pal et al., 2017). 
The challenge of bioterrorism is that although the number of terrorist attacks worldwide 
has decreased in recent years, the lethality of the attacks has become a greater concern.  
Etchegary et al. (2008) expressed concern that biological terrorism might not be 
adequately addressed simply because the public does not recognize or distinguish it from 
other forms of terrorism. Ambiguous knowledge on the part of the public leads to poor 
risk assessment and public reception to risk communication messages. Arrazola et al. 
(2018) argued that in addition to concerns over the extent to which public health 
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personnel know what bioterrorism is, there is also a need for professional definitions of 
preparedness. The concept of nursing bioterrorism preparedness provides nurses with a 
protocol for their responsibilities during a bioterrorism attack. Preparedness is important 
for an additional reason: The level of knowledge that various stakeholders have of 
infectious agents linked to a bioterrorism attack impacts the degree to which they will 
behave professionally during an outbreak and treat patients (Rokach et al., 2010). This 
kind of knowledge is particularly relevant to bioterrorism agents such as anthrax, as only 
informed persons would know, for example, that pulmonary infection from anthrax is not 
contagious. Research has repeatedly found that fear of the unknown may result in 
medical personnel’s reluctance to treat patients.  
Because of several outbreaks of new infectious diseases, the Health Protection 
Agency emerged as a new organizational umbrella for addressing preparedness for a 
bioterrorist attack. However, some researchers, such as Sun and Yang (2017), contend 
that the threat of bioterrorism in the United States is ever-increasing due to continued 
technological and biological advancements harnessed with good or evil intentions. Thus, 
policymakers and researchers in developed, industrialized nations must assume that as 
their understanding of the threat of bioterrorism increases, so do terrorists’ repertoires of 
tools and capacity for inflicting harm. The common bioagents used to spread and cause 
disease include anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia, smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers, 
Botulinum, and Ricin (Pal et al., 2017). In response to the various bioagents with the 
potential to be used as weapons, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
developed a categorization of bioterrorism weapons based on the characteristics of each 
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pathogenic agent (CDC, 2018; Pal et al., 2017). The classification of bioterrorism 
weapons is in three categories, A, B, and C, as presented in Table 1 (CDC, 2018; Pal et 
al., 2017; Sandrock, 2016). In an overview of biological weapons and bioterrorism, Pal et 
al. (2017) argued for the need to identify potential risks despite limited ability to prevent 
bioterrorist attacks. Early detection of diseases and active nationwide surveillance were 









CDC Classification of Potential Biological Agents Used for Bioterrorism Attacks 
Category A agents Category B agents Category C agents 
• Can be easily disseminated or 
transmitted from person to person 
• Result in high mortality rates and have 
the potential for major public health 
impact 
• Might cause public panic and social 
disruption 
• Require special action for public health 
preparedness 
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) 
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) 
Plague (Yersinia pestis) 
Smallpox (Variola major) 
Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) 
Viral hemorrhagic fever (e.g., Ebola, 
Marburg, Lassa, Machupo) 
• Are moderately easy to disseminate 
• Result in moderate morbidity rates and low 
mortality rates 
• Require specific enhancements of the CDC’s 
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease 
surveillance 
Brucellosis (Brucella species) 
Epsilon toxin (Clostridium perfringens) 
Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, 
Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shingella) 
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) 
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei) 
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci) 
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii) 
Ricin toxin (Ricinus communis) 
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B  
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
Viral encephalitis (e.g., Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis, Eastern and Western equine 
encephalitis) 
Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, 
Cryptosporidium parvum) 
• Are available 
• Can be easily produced and 
disseminated 
• Show potential for high 
morbidity and mortality 
rates and major health 
impact 
Emerging infectious diseases 
Nipah virus 
Hantavirus  
Note. Copyright 2014 Dove Medical Press. Reproduced with permission. 
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As an act of terrorism, bioterrorism is the intentional release of a biological toxin 
into the environment with the goal of causing death. Bioterrorism is the deliberate use or 
threat to use biological agents, such as viruses, bacteria, or toxins, to cause illness or 
death to people, animals, or plants (Pal et al., 2017). The ideology of bioterrorism also 
calls for generating as much fear in the population as possible. The threat of bioterrorism 
itself can be unnerving. There are over 180 pathogens identified as possible agents of 
bioterrorism, all easily disguised and extremely transportable without detection (Sun & 
Yang, 2017). Therefore, although bioterrorism is ranked as a low-risk danger, its 
characteristics make it a source of continued worry and concern.  
Bush and Perez (2012) argued that the October 2001 anthrax attack was a 
signature event, commencing a new era of awareness of bioterrorism. This was because 
up to then, an attack of this type—sending through the mail numerous envelopes and 
packages containing anthrax—was thought to be only theoretically possible. The event 
revealed the vulnerability of current systems, with the official response receiving both 
praise and criticism. Thus, public health exists in a new paradigm. As participants in the 
diagnosis of anthrax during the event, Bush and Perez offered a 10-year review of the 
events surrounding the bioterrorist incident. Immediately, there was an anthrax diagnosis 
in Florida with authorities notified, resulting in “one of the largest epidemiologic and 
criminal investigations in U.S. history” (p. 42). The first federal response was to declare 
the event isolated, with little likelihood of spreading. However, with 21 additional cases 
confirmed over the ensuing 7 weeks, this view underwent revision as spread occurred due 
to travel, leading to additional cases.  
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Ironically, in the weeks before the incident, a federal commission had issued a 
report warning that the United States was ill-prepared to deal with a bioterrorist attack 
(Bush & Perez, 2012). Researchers in a Canadian study had examined precisely the sort 
of mail-delivered scenario of anthrax inhalation, reducing the number of casualties. Bush 
and Perez adopted a broad model of bioterrorism, in which the incident itself is a means 
to instill fear in the populous in a way that disrupts and changes lives. The attacks 
resulted in the creation of the Office of Public Health Preparedness within the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, a tenfold increase in the biodefense budget, 
and an extensive investigation into the crime. The report on the investigation, the 
Amerithrax Investigative Summary, published in 2010, concluded that a rogue 
microbiologist in the U.S. Army had acted alone in planning and executing the act of 
terrorism. Other experts, however, continue to contest this finding. 
Upon reviewing the Amerithrax Investigative Summary, Bush and Perez (2012) 
found that the laboratory work during the incident was good, and the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile for responding to the disease worked well, reducing the 
mortality rate. Many medical personnel risked their lives to respond to the outbreak, 
which was also exemplary. At the same time, Bush and Perez argued that the knowledge 
about anthrax was old and outdated, hampering the investigation; the administration of 
the anthrax vaccine was confused and delayed; and physicians’ hoarding of antibiotics for 
personal patients was problematic, leading to a 600% increase in antibiotics sales 
immediately following the event. In addition to providing a framework for understanding 
preparedness for bioterrorism attacks, Grundmann (2014) explained that preparedness in 
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the United States following the 2001 anthrax attacks requires health care workers to 
effectively detect the nature and characteristics of pathogens. 
Poor bioterrorism surveillance increases not only the likelihood of an attack but 
also the significance of the potential consequences (Sun & Yang, 2017). The syndromic 
surveillance system for early detection of illness put in place by the CDC long before 
2001 failed to detect anthrax, resulting in some misdiagnoses (Bush & Perez, 2012). Bush 
and Perez argued that, despite such systemic approaches, it is still necessary to have 
individual clinicians able to diagnose potential bioterrorist agents. As clinicians, Bush 
and Perez concluded, “We firmly believe that an astute clinician will once again be the 
first to recognize the next patient with an illness resulting from deliberate exposure to a 
biologic agent” (p. 44).  
In consideration of emerging health security threats, the primary organization 
involved in countering bioterrorism in the United States is the General Accounting Office 
(Ali et al., 2020). In September 2001, the General Accounting Office reported on federal 
preparedness to counter bioterrorism. The approach to counter bioterrorism, particularly 
since September 2001, has been preparedness. The Department of Health and Human 
Services is the leading agency in responding to terrorist attacks and emergencies that 
impact public health.  
A key element of evaluating the threat of bioterrorism in the United States and 
beyond is biological threat characterization (BTC; Watson et al., 2017). Periodic 
laboratory research improves BTC by increasing the accuracy of biological risk 
assessment and offering government officials a relevant source of empirical knowledge to 
inform the prioritization of bioterrorism resources. Watson et al. (2017) conducted a 
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Delphi study of BTC best practices in the United States. The researchers aimed to elicit 
knowledge from expert participants concerning  
The need for BTC research by the U.S. government (USG); risks of conducting 
this research; rules or guidelines that should be in place to ensure that the work is 
safe and accurate; components of an effective review and prioritization process; 
rules for when characterization of a pathogen can be discontinued; and 
recommendations about who in the USG should be responsible for BTC 
prioritization decisions. (p. 2390) 
Findings from Watson et al. (2017) showed the need for continued research, as 
there was a significant lack of consensus among the participating experts. Particularly, 
participants noted the necessity of continuous review and adjustment of BTC research 
approaches, working toward optimal effectiveness, and decreasing the significant hazards 
and risks associated with conducting BTC research. Thus, in some cases, the first step 
toward a more comprehensive understanding of the threat of bioterrorism in a given 
region is improving BTC research procedures. 
General Preparedness for Bioterrorism Attacks 
This section presents the literature on preparedness for bioterrorism attacks. As 
mentioned, preparedness, particularly in response to bioterrorism attacks, is important 
because there are limitations to preventing such attacks (Pal et al., 2017). Moreover, 
bioterrorism attacks may be an attractive alternative to conventional weapons (Oliveira et 
al., 2020). General preparedness requires federal, state, regional, and local involvement 




Preparedness is a comprehensive concept, including issues such as 
communication, infrastructure, education, and response (Arrazola et al., 2018; Manuell & 
Cukor, 2010; Smith & Davison, 2010; Sun & Yang, 2017). The U.S. government defined 
preparedness as the ability to plan, organize, and mobilize Homeland Security personnel 
in carrying out their assigned missions based on nationally accepted standards (California 
State Auditor, 2006). Public compliance is also a key issue (Manuell & Cukor, 2010). 
The definition of bioterrorism preparedness, however, has been mainly in health care 
settings. According to the American Public Health Association (n.d.), 
bioterrorism preparedness refers to the responsibility of a complicated web of agencies at 
the federal, stage, and local levels and encompasses a wide array of professionals, from 
planners to public health officers, fire, police, school personnel, and others.  
Since the anthrax attacks in the early 2000s, researchers and experts have 
remained divided regarding the threat of bioterrorism in the United States and how 
prepared the country is for future incidents. More than 10 years later, Sun and Yang 
(2017) continued to classify a bioterrorist attack as a low-risk potential, albeit one for 
which preparation was essential, as it could have a high-impact result. However, other 
researchers, such as Evans et al. (2018), have placed more stress and urgency on 
addressing unanswered questions and challenges associated with bioterrorism 
preparedness. The researchers noted how the lack of relevant data about anthrax attacks 
and other bioterrorism incidents impacts how effectively statisticians can predict 
bioterrorism preparedness and implications and inform medical personnel and other 
relevant stakeholders accordingly.  
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In acts of bioterrorism, quarantine and evacuation are two important tools of 
response, and compliance with either mandate is critical for success. Manuell and Cukor 
(2011) examined compliance problems by the public with authority mandates, even in 
emergencies. The findings showed a link between compliance and various issues, 
including life circumstances and work. Perception also played a key role, including the 
perceived credibility of public spokespersons, influential family members, and trusted 
friends (Manuell & Cukor, 2010).  
Previous experience—or the lack thereof—can influence risk perception of a 
similar event, with previous experience both working to favor accurate perception of risk 
and lead to denial if, for example, a person perceives that a previous evacuation was 
uncalled for. If the hazard is new, it is common for people to respond with disbelief, 
especially if “there is any vagueness regarding the warning, or if the person has reacted to 
previous warnings of events that never attained the magnitude predicted” (Manuell & 
Cukor, 2010, p. 425). The bottom line of perceived risk is that if people do not feel their 
life is in danger, they are unlikely to comply with government or public health directives.  
This situation is complicated by the localness of such experience, with some older 
individuals believing that having weathered one emergency, they can do it again. People 
in isolated locales may come to rely on family member perceptions far more than 
officials’ determination of risk level. Individuals’ public pronouncements about the 
danger of the SARS outbreak led many to disobey quarantine requests. Even persons 
diagnosed as having SARS downplayed the risk, refusing to comply with further 
restrictions, like wearing masks or monitoring their temperatures. While some experts 
recommended using fear to reach these people, Manuell and Cukor (2011) felt otherwise. 
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The researchers noted that fear usually causes people to act unwisely in panic mode, 
often leading to negative outcomes, such as those associated with noncompliance. For 
this reason, the warning confirmation process, defined as significant others confirming 
public reports, is critical for compliance.  
Beyond these personal reasons, Manuell and Cukor (2011) also argued that local 
public figure response is critical in determining public compliance to evacuation or 
quarantine. In many cases, public figures may withhold information to avoid panic. 
However, establishing public trust requires clear, consistent, and reliable communication. 
A mistake that officials often make is to assume that residents know the risks of 
problems. Conflicting information coming from various sources can undermine public 
confidence in local officials. In contrast, in effective risk communication, people receive, 
comprehend, and act on warning information. Trust and credibility are critical for this 
sequence of events to occur. Manuell and Cukor presented several examples where 
localities responded to emergencies by communicating effectively or ineffectively. The 
general framework that supports overall public confidence in the trust and reliability of 
public officials is the general level of community preparedness created by emergency 
officials. If a community does not have a history of competent preparedness and has been 
made aware of the need for preparedness, all the above factors seem much less likely to 
contribute to public compliance. Therefore, Manuell and Cukor found that the 
perceptions of officials and the public are vital in determining whether a public complies 
with emergency preparedness plans.  
Jacobson et al. (2010), arguing that specific stakeholder perception of 
preparedness was important, surveyed nurses in North Texas as to their sense of their 
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preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. They found that fewer than 10% felt prepared, 
although 30% expressed willingness to collaborate with the state and federal agencies in 
responding to an event. Some 69% reported that they needed more training to consider 
themselves prepared for such an event. Simulation-based training would likely improve 
nurses’ sense of preparedness (Morrison & Catanzaro, 2010). 
Perhaps the most critical errors in the wake of a bioterrorism attack occur in 
medical facilities and trauma centers; thus, ensuring bioterrorism preparedness requires 
preventing critical trauma procedure errors (Mackenzie et al., 2019). Mackenzie et al. 
(2019) used a trauma readiness index to assess critical surgical errors associated with four 
common trauma procedures. The researchers found that residents’ trauma readiness was 
better than practicing surgeons’. Further, residents’ trauma readiness steadily improved in 
proportion to new training and continued education. Compared to both residents and 
practicing surgeons, experts demonstrated error recovery that was five to seven times 
better. Findings from Mackenzie et al.’s research emphasize the need for continued 
education for medical personnel working in trauma centers. 
Educating the Public 
Preparation for a possible bioterrorism attack entails educating key emergency 
personnel in addition to the general public (Mishra, 2016). Collaboration and joint 
programs enacted by public health and law enforcement are key assets in some countries. 
Such collaborations can involve public health forums and presentations, emergency drills, 
distributing resources, and other activities (D’Arcangelis, 2016; Mishra, 2016). 
Etchegary et al. (2008) expressed concern that biological terrorism might be 
inadequately addressed simply because the general public does not recognize what it is or 
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distinguish it from other forms of terrorism. They presented 1,502 Canadians with a 
series of word associations about chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosive terrorism to determine the extent to which the public could distinguish between 
types of terrorism. The study’s premise was that if the public and frontline personnel are 
not aware of types of terrorism, they will not push for policy to enhance preparedness or, 
worse, be unprepared if such an incident occurred. Fuzzy knowledge on the part of the 
public also leads to poor risk assessment and reception of risk communication messages.  
The researchers used the specialty of risk communication in their study 
(Etchegary et al., 2008). Formerly, risk communication occurred according to the deficit 
model of decision-making, with the public viewed as ignorant and in need of education 
by the experts. A new model has emerged that focuses on gaining the public’s trust in 
regulations based on the belief that far from panicking, the public usually responds to 
crises in a calm and orderly fashion. This only happens, however, with the public viewed 
as a partner in sharing information. Still, if experts do not know what the public thinks, it 
is hard to craft a message to establish these connections. Etchegary et al. (2008) 
conducted content analysis on the results, revealing several uncertainties on the part of 
the public. Overwhelmingly, members of the public expressed a great deal of fatalism 
when describing various terrorist scenarios.  
A survey of student nurses concerning bioterrorism showed their fears of taking 
care of patients with biological threats were misplaced (Etchegary et al., 2008). Student 
nurses did not fear the most dangerous entities, instead worrying about less serious 
problems. Results were similar for members of the general public. For example, the 
public repeatedly confounded biological and chemical terrorism, indicating that their 
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grasp of biological terrorism was poor. This concerned Etchegary et al. (2008), as such 
confusion could mean failure to follow an appropriate course of action during an 
emergency. That the public viewed the concept of terrorism as bombings was also 
problematic, suggesting pathways of exposure and response to it that would not be 
effective in the case of a biological attack. The emphasis on bombing also meant the 
public does not fully understand escape pathways or responses to biological terror. Many 
subjects had trouble finding word associations related to bioterrorism, further indicating a 
very vague sense of what it is. Etchegary et al. recommended that public education is 
needed to help individuals respond better to types of terrorist attacks, thus saving lives.  
Education of the Health Care Community 
Key health care leaders and personnel must have the proper education and 
training to ensure medical preparedness in the event of a bioterrorism attack (Ejike, 
2019). Despite government spending on the issue, Sun and Yang (2017) found that 
complacency among the medical community continued to hamper efforts at preparedness 
in the United Kingdom. Indeed, in the few years immediately following 2001, the 
primary emphasis on preparedness was educating and training the medical and public 
health communities in bioterrorism. Baldwin et al. (2005), for example, framed the need 
for public health first responders to be aware of bioterrorism threats in the context of the 
dangers connected with 9/11 and the War on Terror. The researchers focused on the 
informational dimension of bioterrorism preparedness, arguing that educating public 
health personnel about bioterrorism was the first step in improving overall preparedness.  
Baldwin et al. (2005) described the bioterrorism response education program 
provided through the health care intranet to train personnel cost-efficiently. Although 
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their study was of a trial run of the program, describing its various components and 
modules and evaluating its potential, the scholars nonetheless argued that the health 
community’s overall poor level of awareness of how to respond to bioterrorism 
necessitated this approach.  
The extent to which health care communities are educated and prepared for 
bioterrorism is often a reflection of the threat level and degree of focus on bioterrorism 
by state and federal government entities (Arrazola et al., 2018). In an assessment of 
epidemiology in the United States, Arrazola et al. (2018) revealed a significant decrease 
in the number of epidemiologists dedicated to bioterrorism preparedness. While 
epidemiology positions aimed at containing and preventing the spread of infectious 
diseases in the United States have increased steadily since 2004, positions for preventing 
intentional bioterrorism have significantly decreased. In particular, there were 487 
epidemiologists hired between 2013 and 2017 to address the spread of disease; in 
contrast, there was a 55% decrease in the number of epidemiologists actively working to 
prevent bioterrorism in the United States during the same period. 
During the same study, epidemiologists working for state governments expressed 
a need to hire approximately 1,200 more epidemiologists to ensure preparedness for an 
outbreak released intentionally or unintentionally (Arrazola et al., 2018). The results of 
Arrazola et al.’s (2018) study showed that while medical personnel’s education is key to 
preventing or addressing bioterrorism, education can only increase bioterrorism 
preparedness among hired personnel. Ultimately, if not enough trained medical 




To ensure that nurses maintained a level of preparedness for emergency and 
bioterrorism response, Garbutt et al. (2008) evaluated an assessment instrument: the 
Emergency Preparedness Information Questionnaire. The purpose of Garbutt et al.’s 
study was to establish the construct validity and internal reliability of the psychometric 
characteristics of the scale. However, the study also indicated the need for preparedness 
assessment tools as disaster nursing has migrated from military nurses and emergency 
department personnel to all nurses and personnel. Research on nurses’ level of 
preparedness in terms of knowledge of agents and other procedures for bioterrorism is 
minimal, necessitating an instrumental approach to maintaining preparedness.  
Preparedness is deemed important for an additional reason: The knowledge 
various stakeholders have of infectious agents linked to a bioterrorism attack impacts 
how professionally they will behave during an outbreak and treat patients (Rokach et al., 
2010; Sharma et al., 2019). This kind of knowledge is particularly relevant to 
bioterrorism agents such as anthrax, as only those persons with knowledge of the disease 
would know, for example, that pulmonary infection from anthrax is not communicable. 
Moreover, researchers have repeatedly found that fear of the unknown could result in 
medical personnel’s reluctance to treat patients. Rokach et al. (2010) surveyed 76 nurses 
and physicians in emergency rooms in three public hospitals to analyze the connection 
between the two. The survey included 11 questions about willingness to treat diseases 
developed by the Israeli Defense Forces Home Front Command, noted experts in disaster 
medicine. The study found that physicians and nurses who had extensive knowledge of 
anthrax were 50% more willing to come to work. They were also 37% more willing to 
work with patients suspected of anthrax and 28% more willing to treat patients diagnosed 
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with anthrax. The results proved the need to educate medical personnel about all possible 
infectious agents in a bioterrorist attack to maintain their commitment to treating infected 
patients during the crisis.  
A further dimension of bioterrorism preparedness involves the physician 
specialists who would be most affected and effective in responding to a bioterrorist event 
(Jorgenson-Rathke, 2018). At present, bioterrorists are most likely to use respiratory- or 
pulmonary-disease-transmitted agents, like anthrax and plague. Thus, respiratory 
physicians will likely be at the front line of a bioterror preparedness response; as such, 
they must be prepared to recognize agents and maintain a clinical edge in doing so.  
Syndromic Surveillance 
An essential element in any preventive infrastructure against bioterrorism is a 
surveillance system that detects bioterrorism agents and reports on their presence to alert 
authorities to act (Arani et al., 2019). Syndromic surveillance systems report disease-
specific diagnoses using a statistical algorithm that detects aberrations from prediagnostic 
data, setting off an alert. Simulations of various syndromic surveillance systems 
addressed to specific bioterrorist agents have found predictive values in the receiver 
operating characteristic curves. By accounting for mortality, morbidity, and costs of a 
surveillance agent, a much more accurate and early detection is possible (Thomas et al., 
2018). This kind of surveillance system would be one presumably operated by public 
health personnel.  
Syndromic surveillance entails electronically monitoring and reporting real-time 
medical data as a way to proactively identity unusual disease patterns in the population 
(Stoto et al., 2006). Nordin et al. (2008) stressed the need to review the data from such 
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surveillance carefully, not to violate the civil rights of any individual. Three models of 
data provision to alert systems are currently in use. In the first, the National Bioterrorism 
Syndromic Surveillance Program analyzes aggregate data collected from several local 
medical organizations. Before submission, the system strips personal identifiers from 
disease detection information, with data provided only if an outbreak is detected. Another 
data collection system is Bionsense, operated by the CDC, which also removes personal 
identifiers unless necessary. They proposed three models for this national process 
consisting of public health information privacy boards, institutional review boards, or a 
combination of both. These surveillance groups would protect individual health 
information while extracting the data needed to alert authorities to the detection of a 
bioterror attack proactively.  
To explore issues associated with bioterrorism surveillance, Nordin et al. (2008) 
reviewed a model case study of the complications and tensions between public safety and 
personal identification privacy in the instance of an outbreak based on bioterrorism. 
Although they examined ethical issues beyond this study’s scope, Nordin et al. revealed 
an interface between the local and national where the complexity of ethical issues may 
result in a breakdown of support. One example is an unauthorized release of disease 
information of identified persons in Florida, compromising the privacy of the individuals. 
Nordin et al. stated,  
It is only a matter of time until another public disclosure or inappropriate use of 
private health data by public authorities will result in a massive public outcry; this 
could, in turn, lead to substantial regulatory restrictions on data access. (p. 806)  
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Therefore, another intersection of the public health system could cause a data bottleneck, 
impeding the quick identification and treatment of disease in the case of a bioterrorist 
attack.  
In addition to detection, leaders in the public health system must make several 
decisions upon detecting a hazard (Finley, 2018). Mitchell-Blackwood et al. (2011) 
presented a cost-benefit model to help public health officials decide on a contingency 
plan and determine which actions are justified and appropriate in various scenarios. 
Public health officials must make the key decisions of when to undertake prophylactic 
antibiotic treatment, when to vaccinate, and when to decontaminate buildings. As applied 
to various prioritized elements of the population ranging from high to less exposed, these 
decisions will determine if lives are saved or lost. At present, most decision models are 
based on mathematical models in simulation contexts. Thus, a probability model has been 
used to predict the impact of anthrax and vaccination policies on emergency response 
without considering the costs of the action.  
Mitchell-Blackwood et al. (2011) argued that too many models make 
mathematical predictions but fail to establish when action or treatment is required. Also, 
the cost-benefit factor is an infrequent consideration, presumably because the cost is an 
inhumane response. Mitchell-Blackwood et al. sought to demonstrate that a cost-benefit 
analysis can save lives to the extent that it can direct services where needed, according to 
priorities. In the case of the anthrax scare of 2001, the cost of decontaminating the whole 
Senate building would have been $28 million, while the cost of prophylactic treatment, 
found to be more effective, was considerably less. Mitchell-Blackwood et al. focused on 
an anthrax bioterrorist scenario and found nonnegligible risk thresholds below which 
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certain actions have costs that outweigh their benefits. The model used decision trees that 
presented options and response strategies and calculations of the expected value function 
for each possible outcome to identify the alternative with the highest expected value. The 
researchers used a switchover analysis, deciding when the values of response and no 
response become the same, necessitating a change of decision course. These then 
determine appropriate response strategies, further refined by sensitivity analysis. 
Mitchell-Blackwood et al. found that costly decontamination is less necessary than 
thought and that vaccination is also cost-beneficial when exposure is higher than 1 in 
7,108. Therefore, public health requires many decision structures to ensure that response 
to a bioterrorist event does not cause more loss of life than indicated by a model.  
There are many changing variables in the public health sector, all of which merit 
consideration during any attempt to combat a bioterror attack. Poutanen (2007), for 
example, stressed the importance of preparing clinical laboratories for bioterrorism. 
Poutanen cited the failure of many of the hospital clinical laboratories to respond 
adequately to a SARS outbreak in Toronto in 2002 as a worst-case scenario. The failure 
happened because labs had plans prepared, with no effort put into implementation. 
Poutanen reviewed the case study for what was and was not done well, making 
“recommendations for laboratory biohazard or bioterror emergency planning and 
preparedness” (p. 39). SARS awareness began with an email alert issued by the World 
Health Organization, followed by the admission of SARS-suspected patients. WHO 
issued a press release and held a teleconference with infectious disease physicians and 
microbiologists. Scientists conducted intense contact tracing to determine the extent of 
the initial outbreak. Hospitals implemented Code Orange, mandating the use of N95 
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respirators for all personnel and dictating hospital procedures. Public health officials 
made daily updates of outbreak figures.  
Poutanen (2007) identified response failures, including (a) the lack of a single 
reliable communications system, (b) the absence of laboratory protocols in how to handle 
unknown transmissible elements in an open-concept laboratory, (c) decreased staff due to 
outbreak-imposed constraints or labeling as a nonessential worker and barring from the 
hospital according to the code, (d) the lack national laboratory testing dependability due 
to the inability to keep up with demand, (e) resistance from staff and families for 
autopsies, and (f) difficulty in following metrics throughout the outbreak. Despite 
recommended fixes, the problems indicated the lack of preparedness of a key element of 
the public health system, both nationally and locally: the clinical laboratory (Poutanen, 
2007). One major area where preparedness matters is having access to necessary supplies 
and equipment. Research shows that “mortality was highly dependent on the local 
dispensing capacity” (Bravata et al., 2006, p. 244) for anthrax prophylactic antibiotics. 
Furthermore, only “47% [of hospitals] had allocated funds” (Thorne et al., 2006, p. 414) 
for bioterrorism events.  
Biosecurity 
So urgent have the security needs and concerns of the biological sector become 
that a new subspecialty has emerged: biosecurity (Ryan, 2016; Smith & Davison, 2010). 
This field incorporates all the risks that can develop from biological agents, whether in 
natural or laboratory settings. Smith and Davison (2010) reviewed the need to maintain 
disease detection and surveillance systems to keep track of infectious diseases and 
develop vaccines, antiviral drugs, and immune modulators. Smith and Davison also 
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mentioned dual-use risks or the unintended consequences of scientific research, where the 
challenge is managing risk while not impeding scientific progress. 
Smith and Davison (2010) found the discussion of dual-use risks across the life 
sciences to be poor, with unclear policy and a lack of appreciation of the scope of risks. A 
key element of biosecurity is to ensure that all laboratory workers are adequately trained, 
with properly designed and managed tasks and well-maintained high-containment 
facilities. Best practices for high-containment laboratories were especially important. The 
potential threat of deliberate misuse of dual-use elements, or bioterrorism, was also part 
of the biosecurity purview. But both state-sponsored use of biological weapons and 
terrorist use of biological agents are included in these concerns. There is also the concern 
that developing defensive biological weapons will unintentionally increase the risk of an 
arms race. Smith and Davison argued that transparency is critical so that others do not 
misunderstand the preventive purpose of biodefense research programs. Bioterrorism is a 
lesser concern to Smith and Davison, if only because of the “low number of deaths from 
bioterrorism in comparison to the large mortality rates from infectious diseases” (p. 4). 
The anthrax outbreak of 2001 was caused by an insider threat in a laboratory, making 
internal security another concern and requiring more time to develop personnel reliability 
programs. Advances in biotechnologies, while beneficial, are also open to deliberate 
misuse. In other cases, the development of dual-risk agents has also led to more virulent 
strains of the agent.  
Smith and Davison (2010) commented, 
Whether planned or unplanned, advances in science and technology have the 
potential to expand the scope of deliberate misuse of biological agents and 
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ultimately make it easier for both states and non-state groups or individuals to 
develop and use biological weapons. (p. 5) 
The cost of sequencing has dropped dramatically, leading to the wide availability of DNA 
sequencing technology. Another tool, synthetic biology, provides tools for synthesizing 
pathogens. Both of these advancements will increase the likelihood of nefarious 
individuals acquiring dangerous pathogens. In response to these findings, Smith and 
Davison called for a unified methodology to inform biological risk assessment. That 
multidisciplinary input into the framing assumptions of this methodology will form the 
core of biosecurity.  
Whereas the focus of biosecurity is often high-tech threats, bioterrorists might be 
more interested in low-tech biological work (Walsh, 2018). Many high-tech processes 
associated with bioterrorism, such as replicating poliovirus synthesis, are highly 
challenging and time-consuming, threatening the ability to extrapolate the process for 
dual-use. Terrorist groups could have great difficulty in obtaining enough anthrax or 
other material to cause significant harm. However, there is a lower technological hurdle 
in such low-tech methods as contaminating food or water. Therefore, it is pertinent that 
biosecurity threats are researched and understood based on their potential to do harm and 
their likelihood of occurring and being accessible to terrorists (Walsh, 2018). Thus, there 
should be greater attention on developing diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics to 
strengthen protection against communicable diseases.  
The Public Health and Military Nexus 
Some officials and researchers have argued that educating the current public 
health community is not enough to ensure bioterrorism preparedness. This approach is 
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more likely where “bio” meets “terrorism”—that is, at the intersection of the public 
health community and the national defense, or military, community (Morse, 2018). 
Friedman et al. (2008) adopted a quasimilitary perspective to address the bioterrorist 
threat, viewing bioterrorism as instrumentalized through the weaponization of biological 
agents. They described the primary agent of a bioterrorist attack as a bioweapon, an 
example being distributing smallpox-infected blankets to the enemy in many wars. 
Moreover, terrorism as a context makes the use of this agent worse insofar as terrorists 
are only interested in an asymmetric war “whose main objective is to cause massive 
causalities, panic, demoralization and economic disruption” (Friedman et al., p. 86). 
Determining the potential danger of such an attack entails examining the nature of the 
agent and the method of dissemination. By this measure, the most dangerous threat is 
using advanced biotechnological methods to prepare or modify microorganisms, creating 
hypervigilant microorganisms resistant to antibiotics.  
The infiltration of public health systems could lead to disseminating biological 
weapons to terrorists (Friedman et al., 2008). Addressing this risk requires creating an 
infrastructure characterized by biosafety with the set of physical and administrative 
means that help prevent accidents and biosecurity, which is all structures that prevent 
terrorists from obtaining biological agents, involving physical containment, leakage 
prevention, inspecting work with organisms, transport security, worker reliability, 
information security and overview of science programs. Biodefense refers to the actions 
taken to minimize the consequences of an attack. In their review of dangers, Friedman et 
al. (2008) cited the ability to reproduce the entire genetic code of, for example, the 
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Spanish flu, and set it loose, which is particularly frightening. Speedy DNA production 
facilitates this ability, increasing bioweapon potential. 
To Friedman et al. (2008), a particular concern was a byproduct of the military 
and health systems integration: the dual-use problem enabling the use of technology for 
civilian and military purposes. So much biological research is of a dual-use nature that it 
presents serious problems. Dual-use pertains not only to bioweapon development but 
apparently harmless biological methods designed to prevent disease’s unexpected 
outcomes and their potential use as a bioterrorism weapon. While neutral and for science, 
some research has a clear dual-use potential—for example, publications on the Spanish 
flu virus—which individuals can now create synthetically in laboratories. A significant 
part of biodefense and consequence management must be to monitor and control the 
dual-use potential of biological research. Friedman et al. reviewed a study undertaken to 
determine the extent to which Israel’s biodefense system is effective, finding several 
gaps. The researchers concluded that biodefense necessitates the military and public 
health working cooperatively, though they recommend creating agencies to coordinate 
between the two.  
Scales of priority are a tool to determine to what extent public health resources 
and officials will be deployed to, for example, protect military personnel from a 
biological agent (Vargo, 2017). This bioterrorism prevention research is a means of 
standardizing response administration by creating quantifiable scales or measures. By 
developing evidence-based, systematic, and multifactorial methods for prioritizing the 
level of risk of each category of bioterrorism agents, decision-making is quicker. 
Classifying bioweapons entails considering the disease’s impact using criteria such as (a) 
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infectivity; (b) case fatality rate; (c) stability in the environment, including ease of 
decontamination and reports of genetic modification; (d) the probability of attack criteria, 
including global availability; (e) ease of procurement, (f) ease of weaponization, and (g) 
historical examples upon which bioterrorists can model their efforts. Additional criteria 
used to classify the degree to which prevention or intervention is necessary include the 
lack of preventability and treatability. Systems of classification can be useful to guide 
public policy and help with decisions about which vaccines to amass, when and if to 
vaccinate the military, and how to enact a public response to a bioterrorism attack. 
Because of the link between preventability, lack of treatability, and emergency response, 
there is a need for effective cooperation between the military and public health officials 
in responding to and developing emergency planning for bioterrorism threats (Murthy et 
al., 2017). The military’s primary interests in handling terrorism threats are to catch the 
parties responsible and to secure the area. Public health’s goals are to limit the spread and 
save the most people. Sometimes these perspectives can conflict.  
Local Health and Bioterrorism Emergency Planning 
The prospect of ensuring safety and preparedness from biological infections 
worldwide is becoming increasingly challenging (Alba & Gable, 2011; Choi, 2009). One 
of the preparedness frameworks in the United States is the 2002 Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement, which supports preparedness on the 
national, state, and local levels (Murthy et al., 2017). The agreement has directed $5 
billion to states to develop their preparedness.  
As a result of the agreement, the Stanford Center for Definitive and Curative 
Medicine (CDCM; 2008) found improvements in state preparedness, including (a) hiring 
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more epidemiologists for public health departments, increasing from 115 in 2001 to 232 
in 2006; (b) a dramatic increase in the use of the Epidemic Information Exchange, 75% 
coming from state and local health departments; (c) the availability of 24/7 reception and 
evaluation of urgent threats in all 50 states, up from 12 in 2001; (d) implementation of 
training according to the Incident Command System in all 50 states; and (d) the creation 
of the Health Alert Network in all 50 states. At the same time, state preparedness 
continues to be hampered by (a) difficulties in recruiting epidemiologists, (b) the failure 
of 16 states to electronically exchange health data contained in disease surveillance 
systems, (c) uncertainty over the legal framework guiding preparedness practice, (d) the 
difficulty experienced by 31 state health laboratories in recruiting qualified laboratory 
scientists, (e) 39 states reporting a shortage of staff to perform polymerase chain reaction 
DNA testing to identify bioterrorism agents quickly, (f) states lagging in implementing 
advanced technology, including radiological testing, (g) the inability of any state-level 
laboratory to identity radioactive materials in samples, (h) poor training in most state 
public health departments, and (i) inadequate interoperable emergency communication 
systems in most states. CDCM identified five needs. First, state and local health 
departments need to increase their use of electronic health data for preparedness and 
response through networking. Second, there needs to be an expansion of state-level 
capacity for laboratory testing. Third, states must establish partnerships with commercial 
entities that supply medicines. Fourth, it is important to develop a core curriculum for 
preparedness to guide training. Finally, CDCM recommended that states collaborate with 
partners to improve public health.  
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Further case study details provided by CDCM (2008) highlighted some aspects of 
federal and state cooperation. State-level health departments studied a 2006 E. coli 
outbreak in 26 states after the federal FDA issued a consumption advisory to consumers. 
The FDA used the Health Alert Network to alert all states to an outbreak; in response, 
state laboratories performed DNA fingerprinting and submitted the data to the national 
PulseNet network. Using this network, states could compare and more quickly identify 
cases. Ultimately, state public health departments isolated spinach as the cause of the 
outbreak. Officials from all three levels of government—federal, state, and local—
collaborated to confirm other cases and communicate advisories to consumers. As shown 
in this case, rapid identification led to a spinach recall and quick treatment of those with 
the infection, ending the outbreak. This scenario showed that local and state health 
departments are part of a three-level cooperative federal system that quickly 
communicates results to other states.  
In another incident, a meningitis outbreak in Los California, the public health 
department was ready because of vaccination training, which improved health department 
collaboration with local authorities. Several other local responses to emergency situations 
were also surveyed. As a result, the response to this outbreak was more timely than for 
past events. In this model, the notion of the local is ancillary to the nation. That said, all 
nodes of the system must be prepared to respond. In response to weaknesses in local 
responses, the 2004 Cities Readiness Initiative was a means to help cities establish 
preparedness for biological outbreaks and bioterrorism (Murthy et al., 2017). CDCM 
(2008) found that despite much progress since 2001, state and local health department 
weaknesses remained. In appraising the preparedness of a state or locality, local officials 
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base a large part of their perceptions on their assessment of preparedness of the state 
system.  
Some indication of local stakeholder perception of preparedness for bioterrorism 
is apparent in studies of stakeholder perceptions of emergencies or crises of any kind 
(Ferguson et al., 2019). Emergency preparedness is the general heading given to all such 
procedures and guidelines that local institutions, from schools to local governments, 
develop to respond to extraordinary circumstances (Alba & Gable, 2011). The type of 
emergency a school is most likely to face is violent crime, followed by acts of terror. 
Alba and Gable (2011) also mentioned natural disasters, such as “fires, hurricanes, floods 
and tornadoes” (p. 2), with bioterrorism presumably fitting in this classificatory system. 
At present, although 92% of schools have emergency preparedness plans in place, only 
52% update them annually, and many more fail to support the written plan with training 
programs and provision of resources that make plans implementable.  
Alba and Gable (2011) examined three Rhode Island school districts’ crisis 
preparedness plans. The researchers were particularly interested in elementary and high 
school principals’ perceptions of their level of preparedness for emergencies. Most 
emergency preparedness plans enable schools to implement various drills with first 
responders to ensure student safety. Alba and Gable surveyed 60 school principals, three 
district-level administrators, and three police and fire department first responders to 
determine if there was a significant difference in the perceptions of preparedness between 
urban and suburban stakeholders and elementary, middle, and high school principals, and 
if district leaders and first responders felt differently about preparedness than school 
officials. Respondents completed the Principal Perceptions of School Safety and 
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Preparedness Survey and engaged in interviews. The theoretical background of the study 
derived from crisis communication research focused on public relations. According to 
this model, a preparedness program must include identification and preparedness plans, 
response procedures to mitigate detrimental factors, and recovery actions to repair the 
institution. 
The results of Alba and Gable’s (2011) research indicated that schools at different 
levels had varying degrees of preparedness. Perhaps more interesting, principals 
perceived that external security was greater at the elementary school level, and internal 
security was better at the high school level. High school procedures were also more in 
line with the drills of first responders. Both district-level leaders and first responders felt 
that the procedures were not coherent, with little guidance provided by the state in 
cooperating better. A significant problem identified in the research was that stakeholders’ 
role ambiguity compromised preparedness due to an unclear sense of responsibilities, 
resulting in several gaps in communication and a breakdown of effective collaboration 
between stakeholders.  
The results of principal surveys about their schools’ preparedness and ability to 
handle various situations indicated that although prepared for natural disasters, schools 
are not prepared to handle terrorism (Alba & Gable, 2011; see Table 2). School drills 
were in place for natural disasters 83.1% of the time and hostage situations 38.5% of the 
time. Some 63% of elementary schools were more concerned with a school shooting, 
while 49% had written plans for terrorist attacks in urban and suburban areas compared 
with only about 30% in rural areas. In California, the Standardized Emergency 
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Management plan mandates interagency cooperation but studies of preparedness in this 
regard found that only 45% of schools felt that they could cooperate adequately.  
Table 2 
School Preparedness by Event Type 
Events School preparedness to handle 
Natural disasters 95.8% 




Alba and Gable (2011) argued that this gap might be at the core of the lack of 
translation from written plans to active ability to put them into action. That is, while 
schools have plans in place, they are not training with first responders through drills and 
other means to make them real. Some 30% of schools had never even had drills, 27% of 
school officials had never met with local law enforcement, and 42% had never met with 
local EMS to discuss emergency planning. Alba and Gable concluded that while 
perceptions of preparedness were relatively high, a closer inspection of gaps in 
communication and interagency cooperation indicates “paucity…in the best practices 
regarding their refinement, evaluation and practice with first responder personnel” (p. 
21). Insofar as interagency cooperation is the greatest failing detected in this research, 
Alba and Gable recommended much greater attention to this matter, with first responders 
perhaps taking the lead. That is, local government agencies, as opposed to school 
districts, should oversee the emergency preparedness planning of all local institutions. 
Moreover, although not a focus of the proposed study, the issues associated with 
federalism as related to interagency cooperation and local capacity were of note. 
Particularly, the issue of federalism impacts readiness at the local level (Grundmann, 
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2014). For this reason, there is a need for a comprehensive approach that incorporates 
local, regional, state, and national agencies.  
Impact of Local Capacity 
Local officials’ perceptions of readiness for dealing with bioterrorism are partly 
based on their assessment of the capacity of the current local infrastructure involved in 
emergency preparedness and response (Ferguson et al., 2019; Murthy et al., 2017). Beam 
et al. (2010) described the system in place in Nebraska for the biocontainment of persons 
who contracted a bioterrorism transmitted disease. Biocontainment, as a response, entails 
the availability of isolation units for the care of such patients, a method found to reduce 
the likelihood of spread of exposure dramatically. Biocontainment is one of several 
responses a locality may make to an agent, in addition to or in place of quarantine, ring 
vaccination, or surge capacity for treatment. Nebraska began to develop its 
biocontainment option in 2004 in response to recent bioterrorist attacks, including the 
anthrax attack in 2001. Beam et al. described the procedures undertaken by the 
development team, showing that Nebraska sought help from national and military 
organizations to build its capacity. 
Beam et al. (2010) detailed the creation of the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit, 
part of the emergency preparedness processes at the Nebraska Medical Center. The Chief 
Medical Officer of the state’s Department of Health and Human Services activated the 
unit, composed of full-time health providers at the hospital. Quarterly personnel drills 
keep the team in a state of preparedness. Performance improvement follows from 
postdrill incident analysis and the creation of an action plan. Safety in putting on and 
disposing of personal protective equipment is a priority, a problem identified as a weak 
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link. The lab was also involved with the Omaha Metro Medical Response System to 
provide annual training on the equipment required in biological emergencies. Beam et al. 
found that the system’s success lies in strong leadership, an engaged professional team, 
and successful collaboration with other stakeholders. In this instance, Beam et al. 
described a preparedness model whose implementation was entirely in the hands of 
public health stakeholders. Its recognition as a model of best practice could inspire local 
officials’ confidence that Nebraska was prepared for a bioterrorist threat.  
Choi (2009) studied the networks put in place following the creation of a formal 
plan for a local government setting response to emergency services to swine flu. The case 
study focused on the response by the state of California to the swine flu outbreak in 2009. 
Although this is not a bioterrorist event, the case study provided insight into the 
management strategies of local emergency management plans and policies. The primary 
problem, Choi argued, was that government officials tended to over-focus on the 
emergency at hand and not view the response in the broader context, incorporating 
elements such as hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, and disaster recovery. 
Research also indicated that emergency management is a low priority at the local level, 
without emergency management experts to oversee local response. Many offices were 
underfunded, working with part-time personnel.  
In a previous study, 77% of local emergency managers felt they had little 
influence on the direction of response. Choi (2009) argued that most of the existing 
government response system is “disarrayed, disconnected, uncoordinated, underfunded 
and discredited” (p. 3). This disconnect occurred due to government officials’ tendency to 
see problems from their own vantage points only; different role perceptions, which also 
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affects response; the inability of emergency management officials to control public 
officials’ actions, hampering coordination; and the lack of credibility of emergency 
management in the overall government system. 
Choi (2009) used a cognitive accuracy model to measure the disparity between 
planning and practice in the delivery of local emergency services. Cognitive accuracy is 
“the degree to which an actor’s perceived networks correspond to actual networks” 
(Choi, 2009, p. 3). Accuracy is linked to how well people do their jobs. Emergency 
departments might have a collective cognitive accuracy such that all involved in an 
agency have a common operational picture. Three kinds of emergency management 
network structures are the legal/official network, emphasizing lead agencies; the 
perceived influence networks, based on the organizations perceived as most influential; 
and the actual networks, which constitute the channels through which communication 
passes. Based on these models, Choi suggested that an emergency management network 
depends on the information passed through it to perform well. If the flow of information 
allows stakeholders to develop a complete and accurate picture of their position and 
duties, the network should work well. Stakeholders having a clear picture of the whole 
network also contributes to effective action. Deficiencies in perception will lead, 
however, to a lack of coordination. California has a history of uncoordinated responses to 
various natural disasters, from the state to the local levels. Despite the Health Emergency 
Response Plan in place, its implementation is sketchy. Such dysfunctionality jeopardizes 
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In Choi’s (2009) study, 75% of respondents in all participating organizations 
declared that they understood the state emergency response plan only a little. This meant 
that, despite duties and responsibilities defined by the plan, few understood those duties. 
Only two of seven perceived influence structures identified the lead agency in the 
emergency management plan as most influential. Concerning network accuracy, “Both 
perceived and actual accuracy against the legal/official structure is relatively low” (Choi, 
2009, p. 11). No respondents perceived the lead agency as most influential. They also 
suggested an overemphasis on the legal plan agency and the presence of “substantial 
misperceptions about how the actual network operates” (Choi, 2009, p. 11). Choi 
declared the overall emergency management network in California as Type IV, or 
incoherent. This failure could result from poor communication or local stakeholders 
having developed workarounds to overcome the barriers of antiquated plans and thus 
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working in ways different from the formal plans. Thus, Choi concluded that clear 
leadership is best in public health networks, and that “networks with ambiguous or poorly 
understood communication patterns are those that are most likely to fail under pressure 
during a disaster or emergency (p. 14).  
Government Officials’ Perceptions of Preparedness for Bioterrorist Attacks 
Local government officials’ perceptions of preparedness for a bioterrorist attack 
are indicative of the overall level of regional preparedness (Armstrong, 2012; Baldassare 
& Hoene, 2003; Donahue et al., 2013; Maor, 2010; Nilsson, 2010; Putzer, 2006; Zogby, 
2012). According to some government theory, public perception would likely be an 
important antecedent to local official perceptions of emergency preparedness generally 
and bioterrorism specifically (Zogby, 2012). Zogby (2012) conducted a nationwide 
survey of public perceptions of likely behaviors in the event of an emergency, assessment 
of the overall level of emergency preparations in their community, and opinions on the 
current state of public safety. Zogby was particularly concerned with determining citizen 
reactions to emergencies and if they have developed apathetic attitudes toward public 
safety. Zogby found that although the number of emergencies declared under the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency had increased (there were 99 declared in 2011), the 
public remains unaware of most of the communication processes involved in an 
emergency and generally apathetic about disaster preparedness.  
Zogby’s (2012) findings showed that too many people remained complacent 
about emergency preparedness, many failed to act with a sense of urgency in times of 
crisis, and apathy was widespread. This state of mind can lead to problems during 
emergencies, compounding the problems of emergency managers to ensure public safety. 
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Statistically, the study found that 56% of Americans are aware of disaster preparedness 
plans, 67% of persons over 65 are aware, and 20% of male respondents think about such 
problems often. Some 64% of married persons claimed high levels of awareness; 65% of 
conservatives felt fully prepared for an emergency compared to 49% of liberals. 
Ultimately, over 50% of Americans rated their overall level of preparedness as low or 
very low.  
About awareness as to the existence of a personal alert or notification system in 
their locality, Zogby (2012) found that: 
• 71% reported being unsure if there was a local personal alert system. 
• 36% of respondents reported that they would act based on an emergency alert 
issued by the system. 
• There are more people motivated by an informed family member than radio or 
television. 
• 27% of all adults did not even know if their community had a warning siren. 
• 56% of respondents did not know when or if the sirens in their areas were 
tested. 
• 70% would not recognize a siren, as they are unaware of the sounds and sirens 
associated with warnings. 
• Only 47% of Americans reported that they would be motivated to act based on 
a warning of severe weather. 
Although less than 3% of respondents were confident in federal officials and 16% 
in state officials, 58% were confident in local and regional officials, strongly indicating a 
local and regional perspective of safety among most Americans (Zogby, 2012). At the 
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same time, only 29% felt that their community officials were devoting enough attention 
to public safety, which seems contradictory. Also, 42% of Americans reported that the 
bad economy had negatively affected how much they invested in and concerned 
themselves with the community. Overall, the findings generally indicated a high degree 
of complacency about emergencies among Americans. In this context, 57% of 
respondents reporting confidence in local officials could suggest a “blank check” or 
“passing the buck,” letting the officials deal with it. Of note, all questions involved 
television or radio notification of weather-related emergencies and, as noted elsewhere, 
local cultural traditions of weathering the storm could counteract attention. It may also be 
that such emergencies have become too routine, and TV notifications and sirens are no 
longer adequate methods of alert, not on par with developments in public media usage. 
Overall, it does not appear that local officials have to worry about public outcry or 
opinion when carrying out their duties.  
The NIH has developed a model of dissemination consisting of Translation 1, 
from lab to test trials, and Translation 2, from test trials to practice (Barnes et al., 2008). 
Legislators, health organizations, scientists, and public officials have expressed public 
health concerns that developments that could help the public are not quickly translated to 
public service. Diffusion theory presents a succinct model to address this problem. More 
recently, there has been implementation theory developed to explain why “the effective 
application tends to wane, deviate from the intended use and take on new forms” (Green 
et al., 2009, p. 152), even when ideas and policies reach practitioners who claim to be 
using the new techniques. Researchers have identified 32 barriers to applying scientific 
advancements in an emergency in a way that would save lives. To ease these barriers, 
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public health officials strike to adopt practices that facilitate best practices. However, 
public health researchers on both national and local levels have not yet considered the 
degree to which geographic spread, mass media, community setting, and population 
issues prevent spread. Green et al. argued that the gap is partly the result of “social 
distance between the supply and demand sides of science in geography as well as in 
organizational and professional or personal self-identities” (p. 156). Gaps can be wide at 
the local level because “town-gown social distance prevails because scientists are more 
oriented to the international audiences of other scientists for which they publish than to 
the needs of practitioners, policymakers and the local public” (p. 155).  
Green et al. (2009) argued that the main problem is scientists viewing knowledge 
development as a funnel-shaped pipeline extending beyond the question of usability of 
research in practice. As a result, they conduct more research than required for practice or 
basic research, which works well for biomedical interventions. Public health 
interventions must confront psychological processes, cultural contexts, and 
socioeconomic conditions that mediate or moderate the relationship between intervention 
and outcomes. As such, science scholars dismiss many results that could be relevant to 
the public, resulting in a gap. Green et al. found that it takes up to 17 years to funnel 14% 
of findings to the public, with more lost through leakage, attrition, or loss of knowledge.  
Further, while 17% of research is never submitted, Green et al. (2009) argued that 
unsubmitted findings could include important insights and implications for diverse 
populations. Green et al. reviewed diffusion theory and knowledge utilization theory to 
construct a knowledge-utilization-focused surveillance framework that considered all the 
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social determinants and contexts impacting the diffusion of science for improving 
community and population health.  
Diffusion theory is how innovations and new ideas spread in an area. People fall 
into different adoption groups, and information takes time to reach everyone, and some 
do not receive the communication. In the context of terrorism and preparedness, it is 
important to understand how to deliver new information and ideas about safety to large 
groups of people.  
Knowledge utilization theory suggests that nonexperts will immediately use 
knowledge derived from experts to solve problems. However, this is not always what 
happens, as outside influences have a significant impact. For example, during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, experts professed the importance of masks and social distancing, 
unwelcome information in some groups based on political affiliations. While beyond the 
scope of this study, the umbrella model strongly suggests that as a stakeholder receives 
information, local officials’ perceptions of their level of preparedness for any public 
health situation would be strongly influenced by the extent to which best practice 
knowledge has reached the local level (Green et al., 2009).  
Donahue et al. (2013) argued that there remain “broad gaps in our understanding 
of how, why and when people react to risk, and how effective government preparedness 
policy initiatives are at improving individual preparedness” (p. 1). Donahue sought to 
better understand the nature of individual preparedness behavior as related to perceptions 
of risk and efficacy, implicitly making use of the health belief model. Another goal was 
to determine if the expectations and priorities of local government decision-making were 
consistent with individual citizen perceptions. The premise behind the study was that 
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government programs would be more effective if officials understood why individual 
citizens respond or not to the programs.  
Donahue et al. (2013) took the view that the more prepared individuals are, the 
less governments need to intervene, and the more likely preparedness will be effective 
and tailored to individual needs. Government officials have identified a significant reason 
for the failure of preparedness efforts, namely that the public is unprepared and engaged 
in denial consisting of “a combination of self-delusion, apathy and sheer stubbornness” 
(Donahue et al., 2013, p. 6). As a result, despite many government efforts to create 
preparedness programs, too many citizens remain underprepared for emergencies. One 
study found that only 8% of Americans had done everything they need to do to prepare 
for a disaster, and 32% had taken no steps at all. Concerning attitudes and perceptions, 
researchers have determined that greater perceived risk often causes the public to support 
proactive preparedness programs (Hong et al., 2019). Also, personal threat seems more 
effective in making a person respond (both constructs in the health belief model). Trust in 
government, or the lack thereof, is instrumental in connecting preparedness programs and 
the public (Welby-Everard et al., 2020).  
To determine if there was a link between individuals’ and public officials’ 
perceptions of preparedness, Donahue et al. (2013) surveyed individuals and public 
decision-makers in four coastal regions, with 11 public officials in each region. 
Individuals discussed how much they thought of the consequences of an event, how 
prepared they were, what they had done specifically to prepare, why they had or had not 
prepared, their level of concern, how they appraised their ability to recover from the 
event, and the likelihood of that event occurring; public officials responded about the 
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threats to the community, the likelihood of disaster, the current level of preparedness, the 
adequacy of preparedness spending, how prepared residents were, why residents did not 
prepare, on whom residents will rely in a disaster, how informed the residents are, and 
whether the residents will follow directions. Donahue structured many of these questions 
by calculating self-efficacy derived from health belief model studies.  
Upon analyzing the data, Donahue et al. (2013) found that public officials were 
more resilient and prepared to take risks than private citizens when faced with disaster. 
While both felt that financial risk was the greatest national threat, officials saw natural 
disaster risk as the most pressing at the community level. In contrast, citizens tended to 
see terrorism as a greater risk. Similarly, the public thought they were better informed 
about disasters than public officials thought they were. The public also believed 
themselves more likely to follow directions than public officials expected. Most persons 
reported that they would rely on themselves in an emergency, whereas public officials 
thought the majority would rely on emergency responders. Citizens and local government 
officials equally felt that they need not rely on state and federal agencies. Some 80% of 
the public had considered the consequences of a disaster on their homes; however, most 
did not think a major emergency would occur in their community and were not especially 
worried about it. Public respondents conceded that a major disaster was a significant 
problem, indicating a sense of the seriousness (though low susceptibility) of the threat. 
However, although 75% of the public reported having done something to prepare for a 
disaster, 23% said they had prepared because they take care of others or had been through 
it before. Procrastination was the primary reason for not preparing, usually due to not 
thinking it would happen, with 35% of public officials agreeing with this motivation for 
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not acting (linked to the susceptibility factor in human resource management). 
Approximately 17% of public officials felt that people think it is too expensive to prepare 
for a disaster (which would be a barrier; Donahue et al., 2013). 
Donahue et al. (2013) concluded there was a misalignment between public 
officials and some of their constituents. However, officials understood some of the 
public’s motivations regarding the seriousness of threats and susceptibility factors in 
human resource management, which would account for the lack of preparedness 
planning. Donahue found that public officials’ minimization of citizens’ preparedness for 
a disaster correlates with research on the reality of public preparedness and “could help 
explain why preparedness programs seem to have been ineffective at improving 
preparedness” (p. 18). Overall, Donahue found mixed results about the accuracy of public 
officials’ perceptions of local preparedness in their agencies and among members of the 
general public.  
There has been some research on local government officials’ perceptions of their 
communities’ overall crisis management capabilities. Nilsson (2010) analyzed the 
perceptions of civil servants and political appointees of the strength or weakness of the 
CMC of their communities. All respondents had participated in a vulnerability analysis of 
the municipal capacity, so they had a solid sense of strengths and weaknesses. The results 
were from 10 vulnerability studies conducted by local governments under the mandate of 
the Swedish Emergency Management Agency Act of 2006. About the structure of the 
EMCs in localities, most respondents felt they were lacking, improperly managed, 
difficult to comprehend, or improperly designed. Thus, many perceived the plans as 
based on misperceptions or simply too rigid and inflexible for use in a locality. 
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Respondents also indicated that many functions they expected the plans to have were 
missing and needed. Nilsson concluded that respondents’ overall tendency to criticize 
structures and functions signaled that they were overconfident in the ability of 
managerial, preplanned ways of handling crises. Further, Nilsson suspected that their 
criticism could be due the lack of incorporating preparedness and readiness in the 
organizations, indicating that the organizations lack preparedness. Nilsson concluded that 
questions remain about the degree of comprehension most respondents had of their 
municipality’s crisis management capabilities. 
One solution to the lack of emergency response resources at the local level is for 
clusters of municipalities in similar regional areas to cooperate and respond to each 
other’s problems (Canós & Piedrahita, 2017). In some regions with limited resources, 
particularly rural areas, government officials have expressed that sharing authority and 
resources is the only way for their municipality to protect citizens in an emergency. 
Nonetheless, utilizing purely human actors in regional or local emergency planning 
scenarios can result in misunderstandings. Therefore, Canós and Piedrahita (2017) 
strongly suggested developing a software architecture for community emergency 
planning. Further, Canós and Piedrahita argued that emergency management does not 
take place in government offices, but in the community, involving first responders, local 
hospitals and businesses, and, in the case of transit, local public transportation.  
Researchers have explored the perceptions of various stakeholders involved in the 
biosecurity infrastructure about their confidence levels with the system. Insofar as these 
perceptions would influence communication and cooperation, they are important for their 
consequences on implementing preparedness plans. This issue is also an indication of 
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public trust in authorities, which is important for the successful implementation of 
preparedness plans. For example, Vartti et al. (2010) examined perceptual issues between 
the public health and military components of the biosecurity system. Specifically, they 
focused on the perceptions of conscripts to the Finnish military of the extent to which 
they trusted the information provided by biopreparedness authorities, whether from the 
military, police, health care institutions, or public health bureaucracy. They also 
discussed how well they thought the authority was prepared to protect the public during 
an infectious disease outbreak caused by deliberate bioterrorism compared to a natural 
outbreak. The conscripts reported having confidence in the authorities but placing their 
confidence differently based on the type of incident. That is, during a natural outbreak, 
they would be more likely to trust hospital or primary health care center authorities, while 
in the case of bioterrorism, their confidence switched to defense forces and central 
hospitals working together. Positive, trusting perceptions in both cases were linked to the 
level of education of the authorities involved. Finns have higher recorded confidence in 
authorities than Americans, 88% compared to 66%. This discrepancy is likely because 
the overall average level of completed education is higher in Finland, and more educated 
persons have greater confidence. Vartti et al. concluded that when communicating with 
the public in the context of a preparedness plan, “There is a greater need for tailoring 
communication to match the needs and expectations of various groups of people” (p. 
610). 
Maor (2010) reviewed efforts to improve local preparedness for a general 
emergency in Israel, where the government has created a unique response to preparedness 
problems. Maor defined emergency preparedness at the local level as “the readiness of a 
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police jurisdiction to react constructively to threats from the environment in a way that 
minimizes the negative consequences of impact for the health and safety of individuals” 
(p. 955). Unless the national government declares a state of emergency, localities are left 
to deal with preparedness issues on their own. In reviewing recent cases, Maor found a 
lack of preparation by central government bodies and local authorities, as well as 
“widespread failure” of the involvement of personnel from nongovernmental 
organizations. Israeli officials’ solution to this problem was to appoint independent 
emergency management consultants to advise local authorities on developing an 
emergency preparedness plan, tailoring emergency preparedness to the specific needs of 
each locality. The project has been implemented at 30 localities in northern Israel.  
Maor (2010) evaluated the effectiveness of the consultant’s efforts to help local 
government officials create an optimal and targeted emergency preparedness plan for 
each of their localities. Emergency preparedness for a local administration requires 
disaster planning that involves assessing the management of community disasters, 
evaluating the concept of community preparedness, and considering whether the local 
government is federally or locally focused or both. Some local governments are designed 
to fulfill federal mandates at the local level, with an emphasis on uniformity. Locally 
focused governments address the training needs of individual local authorities, 
presumably because of a perception that the dynamics of the locality are unique and 
uniform approaches would not apply. Israel has generally adopted an integrated model, 
which involves a consultant to the local government. 
To determine how well Israeli officials carried out the project and if it led to local 
emergency preparedness, Maor (2010) interviewed 32 senior city managers, emergency 
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preparedness consultants, and administrators. Maor was particularly concerned with 
whether consultant involvement caused single-loop learning—that is, simple application 
of facts—to become double-loop learning in which the knowledge learned then flows to 
emergency preparedness improvements in routine operations—that is, if lessons in one 
area are applicable in others. Maor found that due to the consultation concepts of 
emergency operation formulated and put into practice, there were structured procedures 
and an organizational structure created. Also, there were second-loop learning gains with 
the professional work patterns modeled by the consultant transferred to all local routines. 
After the consultant left, Maor still found some confusion and commented that “the 
absence of a core concept of municipal emergency operation creates a lack of clarity on 
the services each department in the municipality is supposed to supply to the others” (p. 
966). Overall, however, the study showed that the consultants’ work improved local 
authorities’ beliefs that they were prepared for the next emergency in their communities.  
Local Preparation for Bioterrorism Attacks 
Local cases in various regions of the United States indicate emergency and 
medical personnel’s perceptions of preparedness for bioterrorism and other large-scale 
emergencies. Aldhous (2012) stressed the importance of training, as even a small mistake 
when dealing with biological agents can result in a public health catastrophe. Reviewing 
procedures in place in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Armstrong (2012) found that the 
simulation of a bioterrorist event for health givers to practice caring in such a scenario 
can also help improve overall local preparedness for a bioterror event. Armstrong argued 
that simulation should become part of cities’ routine regimens of preparedness such that 
it becomes a part of everyday life for all citizens.  
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In the wake of 9/11 and for about a year afterward, most agencies at most levels 
of government undertook studies to determine their level of preparedness for a terrorist 
attack of any kind (Medina, 2016). A few of these studies are important to review for 
establishing a baseline of immediate post-9/11 sense of preparedness and improvement 
efforts. Baldassare and Hoene’s (2003) survey of California city officials’ level of 
preparedness for a terrorist attack, administered in the year following 9/11, is relevant. 
The study was significant for identifying the concerns local officials must address in 
preparedness and response, such as the homeland security needs of different localities 
based on myriad sociodemographic and geographic factors. California, for example, is 
highly populated and located near many national ports of entry. However, the state has a 
long history of dealing with natural disasters at the local level and thus has a solid 
emergency preparedness infrastructure.  
Baldassare and Hoene (2003) admitted that their survey represented a “snapshot 
in time, when city officials are in the early stages of assessing the new realities 
confronting local governments one year after the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington D.C.” (p. 3). However, the results were not entirely promising. Although 
many city officials are concerned about homeland security issues, “especially with 
respect to biological and chemical attacks and cyber-terrorism” (p. 1), they spent most of 
their time addressing more immediate crime and economic issues. More specifically, only 
50% and 48% of officials were concerned about biological and chemical attacks, 
respectively. This is a lower level of concern than from local officials in Florida and 
Texas, where 56% and 54%, respectively, are concerned about biological attacks, and 
much lower than local officials in the Northeast, 72% of whom are concerned. Western 
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officials may be less concerned about geography and distance, making it more difficult to 
implement a bioterrorist plan. As a result, the overall level of concern about such attacks 
in California is lower than in other parts of the country. Indeed, while 78% of officials 
expressed concern about crime and 63% about natural disasters, only 38% were 
concerned with biological attacks. Also, 64% cared more about crime, with only 25% 
noting concern about terrorism. Another finding was that most cities have emergency 
preparedness plans to address biological and chemical attacks, but not cyberterrorist acts. 
Local officials in California were about as optimistic as city officials anywhere in 
the country (Baldassare & Hoene, 2003). However, they were less concerned with 
protecting water supplies and hospitals than other officials. One year after 9/11, 
Baldassare and Hoene still found low levels of cooperation between city and state and 
federal agencies, and California local officials did not believe that cooperation had 
increased. Officials in Western cities were the least likely to report high cooperation 
levels compared to the Northeast and Midwest. When it came to raising taxes to support 
more effective plans, most local officials were not optimistic. Since 9/11, only 48% of 
cities had increased security spending, compared to 61% of cities in the Northeast. 
Respondents identified a need for federal aid to train emergency response personnel and 
provide towns with necessary emergency equipment.  
Although Baldassare and Hoene (2003) were concerned with reporting the survey 
results, the issue raised by the results was why local officials’ responses differed based on 
unique priorities. Such varied perceptions of preparedness suggest that a one-size-fits-all 
approach to local preparedness against biological attack will not work. Instead, it is 
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necessary to tailor the response to each locality’s specific cultural, economic, and 
geographic variables.  
In the year after 9/11, a suspected anthrax bioterrorist attack led officials to focus 
on the broader dimensions of preparedness, including response to a public health 
emergency (Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). As a result, the concept of preparedness also 
applied to public health emergencies, with public health advocates and physicians 
responsible for implementing emergency preparedness plans for bioterrorism and other 
attacks (Putzer, 2006). Thus, local public health emergency preparedness must assign 
officials, health advocates, and physicians to manage relevant parts of the plan. This 
designation is more true in rural locales where local physicians are often important 
community stakeholders. Hence, there remain serious questions about the work done thus 
far to establish preparedness. 
The CDC found that exposing 10,000 people to an anthrax bioterrorist attack 
would cost $26.2 million to combat (Putzer, 2006). Absent a preparedness and 
intervention program, 50% of individuals would inhale anthrax, resulting in 32,000 
deaths per 100,000 people. Although the United States has not experienced a large-
magnitude anthrax attack, “The brush with anthrax in October 2011 filled every 
American with a sense of fear and foreboding” (Putzer, 2006, p. 2). The attack killed five, 
with Putzer describing the official response as “marred by misinformation, confusion and 
widespread public alarm which predominantly flowed from the lack of bioterrorism 
preparedness” (p. 2). There was panic as citizens flocked to a doctor’s office to demand 
antibiotics, which would not have helped in any case. Putzer imagined that a large-scale 
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anthrax release, if handled in a comparable way, would result in “immeasurably greater 
levels of chaos, panic and mass hysteria” (p. 2).  
Growing concern is merited. Despite few large-scale bioterrorist attacks 
historically, there has been a spike in attacks since 1995, with 175 incidents occurring in 
1999 (Putzer, 2006). In 2001, there were 629 incidents, although 603 were hoaxes. The 
current definition of a bioterrorist attack is the intentional release of a biological 
infectious agent, such as anthrax, smallpox, the plague, or botulism. The U.S. response is 
Operation Dark Winter, a role-playing exercise undertaken in 2001 to discern federal, 
state, and local agencies’ ability to respond to bioterrorism. The Dark Winter exercise, 
which incorporates an imaginary release of smallpox to 20 states resulting in 1,000 
deaths, showed “several vulnerabilities in emergency bioterrorism preparedness” (Putzer, 
2006, p. 17). Weaknesses occurred in areas of supply, communication, and organization. 
The real-world response to October 2001 anthrax scare demonstrated, however, that a 
multidisciplinary effort involving epidemiologists, public health officials, law 
enforcement personnel, government agencies, laboratory staff, media organizations, and 
health professionals was possible. 
Putzer (2006) argued that “no amount of planning could have produced a good 
outcome without an astute physician who suspected and diagnoses the first case and 
immediately notified the appropriate authorities” (p. 18). The solution, according to 
Putzer, is that frontline health care responders, such as primary care physicians, are 
trained and educated regarding bioterrorism agents to allay patient fears. Putzer 
questioned the viability of many of the purported emergency operations plans developed 
by hospitals, concurring with other researchers that health care was unprepared.  
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A key element in the knowledge of how to respond to anthrax and other agents is 
that contamination usually begins with flu-like symptoms. Thus, patients are more likely 
to visit primary care physicians than emergency rooms, which puts physicians on the 
front line of bioterrorist attacks (Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). Due to the location of energy 
and nuclear sites in rural locales, they are ill-prepared. Urbanites are likely to stream into 
rural locales during bioterrorist attacks, doubling small towns’ lack of preparedness.  
A review of the research on physician preparedness indicated only a few reports 
of physicians being well prepared for a public health emergency. In one survey, just 22% 
reported adequate preparation at their primary care site. After a spike in 2001, physician 
interest in bioterrorism has declined (Putzer, 2006). Additional research has led to more 
questions about the extent to which the public health system’s current capacity can 
respond adequately to a bioterrorist attack. A significant factor that has emerged in 
research based on worst-case scenarios is surge capacity, defined as “the system’s ability 
to rapidly expand beyond normal services to meet the increased demand for qualified 
personnel, medical care, and public health in the event of bioterrorism” (Putzer, 2006, p. 
29). Physicians likely need more training to assist effectively in bioterrorism response 
efforts. 
Physicians’ willingness to respond and their level of training are linked, indicating 
that training is also a way to respond to surge capacity needs (Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). 
In research of physicians’ perceptions of the system to respond to bioterrorism, however, 
only 19% believed that the local medical community could respond adequately. In 
addition, just 21% of physician respondents had confidence in the ability of their local 
hospital to respond (Putzer, 2006). Although 95% of physicians believed that 
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bioterrorism is a real threat, only 13% felt it would happen in the next 5 years. While 
65% of physicians believed they would respond to a natural disaster or an infectious 
disease outbreak, only 26% felt the same about a bioterrorist attack, which suggests the 
latter has elements especially challenging to physicians. That said, physicians who felt 
they could deal with an infectious outbreak were four times more likely to state they 
could respond effectively to bioterrorism. 
Several physicians reported receiving additional training in the period 
immediately following 9/11; however, rural and local physicians remained unprepared to 
address the threat of a bioterrorist attack in their community (Putzer, 2006). Funk (2018) 
reinforced Putzer’s (2006) findings in studying the U.S. health care system’s overall 
capacity to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Results vary by region and locality, with only 
25% of hospitals in the Northwest reporting being prepared. For the purpose of analysis, 
Putzer (2006) distinguished between actual preparedness and perceived preparedness, 
which are rarely synonymous. For example, even physicians trained to recognize and 
treat bioterrorist contamination might not perceive themselves as prepared because they 
have never had a real-life experience doing so. There are also actual and perceived 
barriers to preparedness (Funk, 2018). 
Putzer’s (2006) analysis of rural preparedness for bioterrorist attacks in Florida 
showed a widespread lack of preparedness for bioterrorist attacks among the six 
representative rural physicians interviewed. Lack of preparedness emerged in cognitive, 
clinical, expectation, simulation, and resource preparedness facets. That is, most rural 
physicians were untrained in recognizing the signs and symptoms of bioterrorist-inducing 
agents, as well as the health risks and how to respond. Few rural physicians reported 
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having participated in a simulation exercise or training to prepare themselves to respond 
to a bioterrorist attack, indicating that their overall level of expectation preparedness was 
low. Lack of resources was the most commonly cited reason for being unprepared. Rural 
physicians had many gaps in their understanding of bioterrorism, not due to ignorance but 
to their personal choice and discretion in prioritizing what seemed most important to 
them in their daily performance. Putzer recommended procuring funds for rural 
physicians to attend preparedness seminars to improve their knowledge of bioterrorist 
infectious agents and the procedures and requirements of preparedness.  
Overall, Putzer (2006) questioned the capacity of the U.S. health care system, 
assigned to bioterrorism in the preparedness model developed after 9/11, to respond to 
bioterrorism without assistance in funding, training, and resource supply. Solutions to the 
lack of preparedness have come from researchers such as Adams et al. (2017), who 
argued that community health improvement process models are needed to guide localities 
in improving their response to such events.  
Local Preparedness for Bioterrorism Threats 
Gaining a sense of the effectiveness of the local emergency response in particular 
localities is difficult, as there are limited studies worldwide (Vedula & Shalin, 2017). 
There have also not been studies in each city where bioterrorism attacks have occurred, 
which makes comparing incidents between cities difficult. Nonetheless, local 
preparedness is essential in ensuring an effective response in the event of a bioterrorism 
attack (Grundmann, 2014). How officials and media outlets address medical emergencies 
and terrorist incidents can impact the perceptions of and responses to future incidents 
(Lu, 2017).  
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The GTD has reviewed news and media reports to obtain data on bioterrorism 
attacks for entry into the database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism [START], 2020). This information provided the data used in the 
present study. The following selection presents a summary of the GTD’s key findings. 
Long-Term Impacts of Terrorism 
The long-term impacts of terrorism on the American people are largely unknown. 
There have been few articles written to educate the general public on what happens 
following the loss of life due to terrorist acts of violence and havoc. Many authors have 
published articles and books to address the topic, but they are not comprehensive. An 
important area of discussion is the psychology of terrorism: how it affects the minds of 
people who suffer such acts, and how it affects U.S. foreign policy in the name of 
protecting the United States and its people from harm.  
Fear is a profound, long-term impact of terrorism. Even after a series of domestic 
terror attacks, people are still as surprised and horrified when it happens again. The 
feeling of panic and disorientation that follows an event can be either short- or long-term, 
dissipating after a few months or remaining for years. Victims who live near the event or 
lose family members might never regain their sense of self or normalcy. 
Some long-term implications of terrorism are not as widely known. Terrorism 
breeds fear in foreign nations and the American people. Foreign leaders often blame 
another country’s citizens and the media for reporting on and encouraging terrorism. The 
long-lasting impacts of terrorism tend to lower a nation’s GDP. Even if a country can 
defeat a terrorist organization, it will still suffer the long-term impacts due to the severe 
disruption of its domestic and foreign policies. Terrorism can impede economic growth 
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through other means. In addition, many victims of terrorism become unemployed. They 
may face difficulties in society because of an inability to find jobs due to economic 
turmoil.  
Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. The literature 
review showed that regional officials are only modestly confident that their local 
communities and governments are prepared to adequately respond to a terrorist event 
(Bush & Perez, 2012; Sun & Yang, 2017). In addition, there are many reasons for gaps 
between ideal preparedness and the current state of preparedness. The review showed that 
the factors measured in the health belief model, whether acknowledged or not in studies 
of preparedness, frequently affect how officials and others calculate their current level of 
preparedness. Establishing local capacity for preparedness and disaster response also 
emerged as a significant issue. As reflected in this review, there have been no published 
quantitative descriptive studies on terrorism in the United States between 2001 and 2018 
using information from GTD. 
The review showed preparedness as the primary paradigm utilized to formulate a 
plan to respond to a terrorism incident. The general state of preparedness for a terrorist 
attack from federal to local levels in the United States was only adequate (Arrazola et al., 
2018; Manuell & Cukor, 2010; Poutanen, 2007; Smith & Davison, 2010; Sun & Yang, 
2017). The review showed that the public is poorly prepared for such an event and poorly 
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educated about preparedness. Even the health care community is unprepared, both in 
knowledge and the capacity to respond effectively to a terrorist attack. The preparedness 
infrastructure is highly complex, calling for terrorism surveillance systems and the 
myriad collaboration problems between the public health and military sectors. 
A few case studies indicated how localities could create preparedness and respond 
effectively to a terrorist event as interpreted through the lens of the health belief model. 
However, local officials’ perceptions of preparedness are fair to poor, which provides a 
fairly accurate picture of the actual state of preparedness (Armstrong, 2012; Baldassare & 
Hoene, 2003; Donahue et al., 2013; Maor, 2010; Nilsson, 2010; Zogby, 2012). However, 
there is a lack of quantitative data to provide a comprehensive picture of the state of 
terrorism in the United States. Moreover, with the current COVID-19 pandemic, there is 
a lack of equipment and facilities due to the increased strain on the system. Although the 
present study does not contribute to the literature on understanding the state of 
preparedness, it was an examination of the state of terrorism in the United States. 
Moreover, the results of the present study could help to determine whether differences 
existed in the attacks between 2001 and 2018 based on the region of the terrorism 
incident, information useful to help regions that have experienced such attacks prepare 
for future attacks or threats. Chapter 3 presents the study’s methodology, including the 
research design, sample selection, and data analysis approach. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The problem addressed by this study was that regional and local officials were 
only modestly confident that their communities and governments were prepared to 
adequately respond to a terrorist event based on analysis of multiple factors (Brandeau, 
2019; David & Le Dévédec, 2018; Scott & Errett, 2018; Welby-Everard et al., 2020). A 
primary paradigm utilized to formulate a plan to respond to a terrorism incident is the 
concept of preparedness. Preparedness involves forecasting and taking precautionary 
measures prior to an imminent threat when advance warnings are possible (United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, n.d.). Previous research showed 
that the public was poorly prepared for terrorism and that many corners of the health care 
community were relatively unprepared both in knowledge and capacity to respond 
effectively to a terrorist attack (Eto & Kanatani, 2018; Funk, 2018). There was also a lack 
of research on the trends in terrorist attacks based on the region of attack. This was 
particularly true at the local, or city and community, level, where local officials were 
caught between funding problems and a need for preparedness and did not exhibit a high 
degree of preparedness for terrorism as a result (Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). Thus, new 
region-specific research was necessary to provide key stakeholders with the necessary 
knowledge to make effective, evidence-based decisions about terrorism preparedness. 
This study focused specifically on trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 and 
how these trends differ by region.  
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
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(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. Understanding 
surveillance, early detection, effective isolation of terrorists, control of the movement of 
potentially involved individuals, and risk communication was essential for improving 
preparedness (Green et al., 2019). The importance of understanding the trends in terrorist 
attacks in the United States is the need to be prepared to respond to potential terrorist 
attacks. In this chapter, I present the methodology for this study. This chapter includes 
the research design and rationale, research method, threats to validity, and ethical 
procedures. Chapter 3 concludes with a summary and transition to Chapter 4. 
Research Design and Rationale 
A quantitative approach aligned with the purpose of this study to examine trends 
in terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and whether factors 
related to terrorist attacks varied by region. Quantitative researchers collect and analyze 
numerical data to describe, explain, predict, or control variables pertaining to the 
phenomenon of interest (Gay et al., 2009). In this study, I described and interpreted the 
status of terrorist incidents in the United States from 2001 to 2018 as reported in GTD. 
Therefore, quantitative methodology was best suited for the study.  
A descriptive quantitative study design was appropriate for examining this 
phenomenon. The purpose of descriptive quantitative research is to describe and interpret 
the status of individuals, settings, conditions, or events (Mertler, 2014, 2016). I described 
and interpreted the status of terrorist incidents in the United States from 2001 to 2018 as 
reported in GTD. To answer the RQ1 and RQ2, I used descriptive statistics, including 
frequency counts and time-series charts, to examine the trends in the number of incidents, 
injuries, and fatalities associated with terrorism incidents between 2001 and 2018, as well 
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as trends in the regions in which the terrorism incidents occurred. To answer RQ3, I used 
a multinomial logit model because it assumed that the data were case-specific and could 
be used with nominal variables (Long, 2014; Rodriguez, 2007). For RQ3, the 
independent/predictor variables that I examined against the dependent variable of region 
of the incident were the weapon used and target type of the terrorism incident. 
Because I utilized historical secondary data to analyze previous terrorist attacks, 
the data were case-specific by each terrorist attack (i.e., terrorism incident). I utilized 
secondary data in this quantitative study from the GTD. I used descriptive statistics, 
including frequency counts and time-series analyses, to determine the trends in terrorist 
attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018, including trends by region in the 
number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities. I used multinomial logit analysis to identify 
the relationships between the region of the terrorist attack and the characteristics of the 
terrorist attack (weapon used and target type).  
Population 
There were no human subjects used in this study. The subject of this study was 
terrorism incidents, also known as terrorist attacks, in the United States between 2001 
and 2018. The data included all terrorism incidents that occurred between 2001 and 2018 
in the United States and appeared in the GTD. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
The sample included GTD-recorded data on terrorism incidents that occurred 
between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. There was no sampling from the database, 
with all incidents included in the data set. 
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
I utilized secondary data from the GTD study. The GTD data are available to the 
public for individual use, including scholarly, educational, and research purposes 
(START, 2020). I obtained permission to download and use the GTD data by registering 
online as an individual user. I did not access the data set until completing the proposal 
defense and obtaining Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
The source of data for this study was the data set obtained from the GTD. All data 
were from terrorism incidents in the United States between 2001 and 2018. All constructs 
used in this study were based on the definition of variables included in the GTD. Variable 
definitions were not modified in this study. GTD (2019) defined a terrorist attack as “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a 
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (p.1 
/para. 3). Within this definition, the following attributes were present to consider an 
incident a terrorist attack: (a) the incident was intentional, (b) the incident involved some 
level of violence or immediate threat of violence, and (c) the perpetrators of the incident 
were subnational actors. In addition to the attributes, at least two of the following criteria 
were present for each incident included in the GTD: 
1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal.  
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  
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3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. (GTD, 
2019, p. 11) 
To answer RQ1 and RQ2, I used descriptive statistics, including frequency counts 
and time-series charts, to examine the trends in the number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities associated with terrorism incidents between 2001 and 2018, as well as trends in 
the regions in which the terrorism incidents occurred. A description of these variables, 
including how they were conceptualized in the GTD (2019) codebook, appears in Table 
3. 
Table 3 
Operationalization of Variables for Research Question 1 and Research Question 2 
Type of variable Name of variable in 
GTD codebook 
Description of variable 
Explanatory/descriptive variables   
Incident ID Eventid Starting from 1 (all 
terrorism incidents that 
occurred between 2001 and 
2018 in the United States) 
City of incident City Text variable (nominal) 
Year of incident Iyear Numeric variable 
Total number of injured Nwound Numeric variable 
Total number of fatalities Nkill Numeric variable 
 
I used a multinomial logit model to answer RQ3. I selected the model because of 
the assumption that the analyzed data were case-specific and could be used with nominal 
variables (Long, 2014; Rodriguez, 2007). For RQ3, the independent variable was the 
region of the terrorist attack, and the dependent variables were the weapon used and 
target type of the terrorism incident. For the manipulation of the data, the incidents were 
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nested (collapsed) by the region in which the incident occurred. A description of these 
variables, including their conceptualization in the GTD (2019) Codebook, is in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Operationalization of Variables for Research Question 3 
Type of variable Name of variable in 
GTD codebook 
Description of variable 
Dependent variable   
Region of incident region Text variable (nominal) 
Independent variables   
Weapon used weapdetail Text variable (nominal) 
Target/victim type targtype1; 
targtype1_txt 
Target type variable 
(nominal) 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
Descriptive statistics, including frequency counts and time-series analysis, were 
useful to determine the trends in terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 
2018, including trends by region in the number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities. 
Multinomial logit analysis was appropriate to determine the relationships between the 
region of the terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (weapon used 
and target type). Specifically, multinomial logit analysis allowed me to predict 
categorical (nominal) placement or the probability of membership of a dependent 
variable based on multiple independent variables. As I used secondary data for this study, 
I downloaded and cleaned them in Microsoft Excel before analysis. I used R software to 
complete all analyses in this study. 
The following research questions and associated hypotheses guided this study:  
RQ1: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States?  
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H01: There were no changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. 
Ha1: There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. 
RQ2: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States by region? 
H02: There were no changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States by region. 
Ha2: There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States by region. 
RQ3: What was the relationship between the region of the terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type)? 
H03: There was no statistically significant relationship between the region of 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor 
variables: weapon used and target type). 
Ha3: There was a statistically significant relationship between the region of 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor 
variables: weapon used and target type) for one or more regions and one or more 
characteristic of terrorist attack. 
Threats to Validity 
The use of secondary data necessitates consideration of threats to validity. The 
GTD was appropriate for this study because it was the most comprehensive unclassified 
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database for terrorist attacks in the world (START, 2020). The data included in the GTD 
were from more than 4 million news articles and 25,000 news sources on incident data 
between 1998 and 2019. As the world’s most comprehensive unclassified database 
managed by a team of researchers and technical staff, the GTD was valid for this study. 
Ethical Procedures 
After obtaining IRB approval (No. 09-21-18-0077352), I accessed the data from 
the GTD database for use in this study. Prior to accessing the data, I obtained permission 
from START by completing the GAD registration form. No confidential participant data 
were collected as no human subjects were engaged in this study. I stored all electronic 
data on my password-protected personal computer. I will keep all the data for 5 years 
following study completion, after which time I will shred all physical data and delete all 
electronic files. 
Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. A quantitative 
method aligned with the purpose of this study, which was to examine trends in terrorist 
attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and investigate whether factors 
related to terrorist attacks varied by region. There were no human subjects used in this 
research. The study subject was terrorism incidents, also known as terrorist attacks, in the 
United States between 2001 and 2018. All terrorism incidents that occurred in the United 
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States during this time and were recorded in the GTD comprised the data set for this 
study.  
I used secondary data to examine and interpret the status of terrorism incidents in 
the United States from 2001 to 2018 as reported in GTD. To answer RQ1 and RQ2, 
descriptive statistics, including frequency counts and time-series charts, were useful to 
examine the trends in the number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities associated with 
terrorism incidents between 2001 and 2018, as well as trends in the regions in which the 
terrorism incidents occurred. I used a multinomial logit model to answer RQ3. The 
multinomial logistic model was appropriate because it assumed that the data were case-
specific and could be used with nominal variables (Long, 2014; Rodriguez, 2007). 
Multinomial logit analysis is effective to predict categorical (nominal) placement or the 
probability of membership of a dependent variable (region of the terrorism incident) 
based on the independent variables (weapon used and target type of the terrorism 
incident). For RQ3, the independent/predictor variables I examined against the dependent 
variable of region were the weapon used and target type of the terrorism incident. I used 
R software to analyze the data in this study. 
In this chapter, I described the specific details of the methodology. The discussion 
included the research design and rationale, instrumentation, data collection procedures, 
and data analysis plan. The chapter also included the threats to validity and ethical 
procedures in consideration of the use of secondary data and the absence of human 
participants in this study. Chapter 4 presents the results of this study obtained by using 
the methods described in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. I used secondary 
data obtained from the GTD. There were 531 terrorist attacks recorded across the United 
States between 2001 and 2018. I conducted descriptive analysis and chi-square analysis 
to address the research questions. 
This chapter begins with a restatement of the research questions and hypotheses 
that guided this study. Discussions about the data collection procedures, descriptive 
analysis of the sample, and testing of data assumptions follow. Next, I present the results 
from descriptive analysis and time series analysis for the research questions. A summary 
of the results concludes this chapter. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study focused on identifying key variables related to trends in terrorist 
attacks in the United States. The three research questions and hypotheses that guided this 
study were:  
RQ1: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States?  
H01: There were no changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. 
Ha1: There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States. 
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RQ2: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States by region? 
H02: There were no changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States by region. 
Ha2: There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States by region. 
RQ3: What was the relationship between the region of the terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type)? 
H03: There was no statistically significant relationship between the region of 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor 
variables: weapon used and target type). 
Ha3: There was a statistically significant relationship between the region of 
terrorist attack and the characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor 
variables: weapon used and target type) for one or more regions and one or more 
characteristic of terrorist attack. 
Data Collection 
I collected GTD data after obtaining IRB approval. The data included terrorist 
attacks from 2001 to 2018 along with number of injuries, fatalities, weapons used, target 
type, and perpetrator group. The perpetrator group comparisons were not relevant due to 
the large number of groups and sparseness of the data. The terrorist attacks were also 
categorized by the city and state in which they occurred. Because the number of attacks 




The sample included 531 terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018. Of this sample, 
the most attacks occurred from 2016 through 2018. In contrast, the smallest number of 
attacks occurred in 2004, 2006, and 2007 (see Figure 4). The average number of people 
injured across terrorist attacks was 1.20 (SD = 7.55). The average number of fatalities 
across terrorist attacks was 6.11 (SD = 83.57).  
Figure 4 
Number of Attacks by Year 
 
Table 5 presents the characteristics of the terrorist attacks between 2001 and 
2018. The majority of attacks occurred in California (n = 76; 14.3%), followed by New 
York (n = 53; 10.0%), Washington State (n = 36; 6.8%), Texas (n = 34; 6.4%), Florida (n 
= 32; 6.0%), and Virginia (n = 17; 3.2%). In addition, the majority of terrorist attacks 
were targeted toward private citizens and property (n = 137; 25.8%), businesses (n = 100; 
18.8%), and religious figures or institutions (n = 97; 18.3%). For terrorist attack type, 237 


























(21.1%) were bombings or explosions, 40 (7.5%) were unarmed assaults, 6 (1.1%) were 
hijacking, 5 (0.9%) were hostage (barricade), 4 (0.8%) were assassination, and 2 (0.4%) 
were hostage (kidnapping). Most terrorist attacks take place in large, population-dense 
states. This is likely because more people live in these areas, making them target-rich 
environments. However, the research does not prove a causal relationship.  
For weapon type, 234 (44.1%) were incendiary, 114 (21.5%) were firearms, 101 
(19.0%) were explosives, 35 (6.6%) were melee, 20 (3.8%) were biological, and 15 
(2.8%) were vehicle. Less common weapon types were chemical (n = 5; 1.0%), sabotage 
equipment (n = 4; 0.8%), other (n = 2; .4%), and fake weapons (n = 1; 0.2%).  
Table 5 
Characteristics of the Terrorist Attacks Between 2001 and 2018 
Variable Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Location of attack (state)   
California 76 14.3 
New York 53 10.0 
Washington 36 6.8 
Texas 34 6.4 
Florida 32 6.0 
Virginia 17 3.2 
Pennsylvania 16 3.0 
Missouri 15 2.8 
Arizona 14 2.6 
District of Columbia 14 2.6 
Others 224 42.2 
Attack type   
Facility/infrastructure attack 237 44.6 
Armed assault 125 23.5 
Bombing/explosion 112 21.1 
Unarmed assault 40 7.5 
Hijacking 6 1.1 
Hostage-taking (barricade incident) 5 0.9 
Assassination 4 0.8 
Hostage-taking (kidnapping) 2 0.4 
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Variable Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Target type   
Private citizens and property 137 25.8 
Business 100 18.8 
Religious figures/institutions 97 18.3 
Government (general) 51 9.6 
Educational institution 29 5.5 
Abortion related 28 5.3 
Police 28 5.3 
Military 14 2.6 
Journalists and media 9 1.7 
Utilities 8 1.5 
Others 30 5.6 
Weapon used   
Incendiary 234 44.1 
Firearms 114 21.5 
Explosives 101 19.0 
Melee 35 6.6 
Biological 20 3.8 
Vehicle 15 2.8 
Chemical 5 0.9 
Sabotage equipment 4 0.8 
Other 2 0.4 
Fake weapons 1 0.2 
 
Assumption Testing 
To address the research questions, I conducted time-series analysis and chi-square 
analysis. The time-series analysis was for RQ1 and involved the use of line graphs and 
descriptive statistics. In contrast, the chi-square analysis conducted for RQ2 and RQ3 
required specific assumptions for its usage. The assumptions for the time-series analysis 
and chi-square analysis receive discussions in the following sections. 
Time-Series Analysis 
Time-series analyses were useful to evaluate the effects of terrorist attacks in the 
United States using R Version 1.2.5033. I conducted the time-series analysis using 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models and transfer functions to test 
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the hypothesized impact of number of injured and number of fatalities during terrorist 
attacks across several days.  
The identification of models consisted of examining the autocorrelation function 
(ACF) and conducting formal tests for unit roots with the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
Preliminary 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑞)365 models were conducted, and the adequacy of the ACF 
and Ljung-box Q was examined. The ARIMA model for injured (as shown in Figure 5) 
suggested a 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(0,0,0)365 with a nonzero mean. The ARIMA model for fatalities (as 
shown in Figure 7) suggested a 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(0,0,2)365 with a zero mean. The residuals in the 
models presented exhibited independence and normality.  
Figure 5 









Chi-square analysis has six assumptions that must be met before its use. 
Following are the assumptions: 
Assumption 1: The Data in the Cells Should Be Frequencies or Counts of 
Cases Rather Than Percentages or Some Other Transformation of the Data. The 
data in the cells for RQ2 and RQ3 were the number of attacks, injuries, and fatalities. 
These variables were measured in continuous form (or counting form). Specifically, the 
number of attacks refers to the total count of unique terrorist attacks recorded, the number 
of injuries refers to the total count of people who were injured for each terrorist attack, 
and the number of fatalities refers to the total count of people who died for each terrorist 
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attack. Therefore, the assumption that the data in the cells should be frequencies or counts 
of cases was met.  
Assumption 2: The Levels (or Categories) of the Variables Are Mutually 
Exclusive. The levels for RQ2 and RQ3 came from region, attack type, target type, and 
weapon used. As seen in Table 5, each of these variables was measured categorically, and 
each of the categories was different from the others. In other words, each terrorist attack 
can only belong to one category for region, attack type, target type, and weapon used. For 
example, the 9/11 terrorist attack was considered hijacking (attack type), private citizens 
and property (target type), and vehicle (weapon used) in the Northeast region. Therefore, 
the assumption that levels of the variables are mutually exclusive was met.   
Assumption 3: Each Subject May Contribute Data to One and Only One Cell 
in the χ2. The data gathered from GTD were all unique terrorist attacks that had 
happened between 2001 and 2018. There were no duplicate records found. Each subject 
(terrorist attack) was categorized according to region, attack type, target type, and 
weapon used. As per Assumption 2, each terrorist attack was categorized uniquely to 
each of the categories of region, attack type, target type, and weapon used, which 
indicates that each terrorist can contribute to the chi-square table only once. Therefore, 
the assumption that each subject may contribute data to one and only one cell in the χ2 
was met.   
Assumption 4: The Study Groups Must Be Independent. As mentioned, each 
record of terrorist attack was unique and was categorized independently. There were no 
paired samples in the data set. Therefore, the assumption that the study groups must be 
independent was met. 
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Assumption 5: There Are Two Variables, and Both Are Measured as 
Categories, Usually at the Nominal (Categorical) Level. For and RQ2 and RQ3, the 
three examined variables were region and either injuries or fatalities, as well as region 
and either attack type, target type, or weapon used. I measured these variables nominally. 
Therefore, the assumption that there are two nominal variables being examined was met.   
Assumption 6: The Value of the Expected Cell Should Be Five or More in at 
Least 80% of the Cells, and No Cell Should Have an Expected of Less Than One. 
The results of the chi-square analysis for RQ2 and RQ3 confirmed that the assumption 
where the expected cell should be five or more in at least 80% of the cells was met. 
Results 
Research Question 1 
RQ1: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States?  
Time-series analysis was the means to identify trends in the number of injured 
and fatalities in terrorist attacks from 2001 to 2018. Table 6 shows the parameter 
estimates calculated from the time-series analysis. For injured, the model suggested was 
ARIMA(0,0,0). However, this model would typically represent white noise, which was 
not the case as per the Ljung box test. As such, I manually trained the ARIMA model and 




AR and Seasonality Parameter Estimates 
 Model Estimate Std. Error Z-value Pr(>|z|) 
Injuries AR -0.51312 0.060267 -8.5141 2.20E-16 *** 
 SAR -0.50236 0.060944 -8.2429 2.20E-16 *** 
Fatalities AR -0.50988 0.060449 -8.4349 <2e-16 *** 
 SAR -0.00418 0.005931 -0.7045 0.4811  
 
The AR model for the injuries time-series data set indicated time was a significant 
predictor of injuries associated with terror activities (β = -0.513, p = 0.001), suggesting a 
downward trend in injuries likely to occur during terrorist attacks in the United States 
between 2001 and 2018. Second, the seasonality model for the injuries data set was also 
statistically significant (β = -0.5023, p = 0.001), suggesting a similar downward trend 
after every 12 months.  
The AR model for fatalities was statistically significant (β = -0.51, p = 0.001), 
indicating a downward trend in the number of fatalities that occur during terrorist attacks 
in the United States between 2001 and 2018. However, the seasonality model for the 
fatalities data set was not statistically significant (β = -0.0042, p = 0.48), indicating no 
trend in the number of fatalities after every twelve months.  
Consequently, the first alternative hypothesis—There were changes in terrorist 
attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the 
United States—was accepted. Generally, the findings indicate the numbers of fatalities 
and injuries associated with terrorist attacks are reducing with time. The statistical results 
are consistent with the visual analysis conclusions of Figures 7 and 8. The number of 
injured and fatalities across time are relatively low throughout the 8-year period, with 
107 
 
some notable spikes such as during the 9/11 terrorist attack, Boston Marathon bombing in 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Research Question 2 
RQ2: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States by region? 
Attacks 
Due to the sparseness of terrorist-related attacks, injuries, and fatalities data by 
cities, regional data were used instead. As shown in Table 7, the total number of terrorist 
attacks between 2001 and 2018 was 531, the total number of injuries from these attacks 
was 23,686, and the total number of fatalities was 3,368. Excluding the 9/11 attacks, the 
number of terrorist attacks was greatest in the West (35.9%), followed by Midwest 





Number of Incidents, Injuries, and Fatalities by Region Between 2001 and 2018 
Region Number of attacks Number of injuries Number of fatalities 
Northeast 90 22,149 2,858 
Southeast 20 24 12 
Midwest 94 62 15 
Southwest 43 243 62 
West 189 948 126 
South Atlantic 95 260 295 
Grand total 531 23,686 3,368 
Note. Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania. Southeast: Alabama, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Tennessee. Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota. Southwest: 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas. West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and 
Washington. South Atlantic: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia, and West Virginia. 
Injuries 
A chi-square analysis was used to compare region and number of injuries. It must 
be noted that injuries from the 9/11 attacks were excluded in the chi-square analysis, 
which reduced the number of injuries in the Northeast from 22,149 to 384. The results 
showed a significant difference between region and the number of injuries, 2(5) = 
22.154, p < .05. Across all terrorist attacks, 23.0% resulted in injuries, ranging from 
14.3% to 34.5% across regions. Post-hoc analyses revealed significantly fewer injuries in 
West (14.3%) terrorist attacks compared to the other regions. In addition, terrorist attacks 
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in the Southwest (37.2%) and Northeast (34.5%) had significantly more injuries than the 
other regions. The Midwest, Southeast, and South Atlantic did not differ in their 
percentage fatalities from terrorist attacks (ps > .05). Table 8 presents the frequency of 
injuries by region. 
Table 8 
Summary of Frequency of Injuries by Region Between 2001 and 2018 
Region No injuries Yes injuries  
Midwest 72 (76.7%) 22 (23.4%)  
Northeast 57 (65.5%) 30 (34.5%)  
Southeast 15 (75.0%) 21 (25.0%)  
Southwest 27 (62.8%) 5 (37.2%)  
West 162 (85.7%) 16 (14.3%)  
South Atlantic 73 (77.7%) 27 (22.3%)  
Grand total 406 (77.0%) 121 (23.0%)  
 
Note. The four 9/11 attacks were excluded. 
Fatalities 
A chi-square analysis was used to compare region and the number of fatalities. It 
must be noted that the fatalities from the 9/11 attacks were excluded in the chi-square, 
which reduced the number of fatalities from Northeast from 2,858 to 44. The results 
revealed a significant difference between region and the number of fatalities, 2(5) = 
22.154, p < .05. Post-hoc analyses revealed significantly fewer fatalities in Midwest 
(8.5%) and West (11.6%) terrorist attacks compared to the other regions. In addition, 
terrorist attacks in the Southwest had significantly more fatalities (34.9%) than the other 
regions. The Northeast, Southeast, and South Atlantic did not differ in their percentage 





Summary of Frequency of Fatalities by Region Between 2001 and 2018 
Region No fatalities Yes fatalities 
Midwest 86 (91.5%) 8 (8.5%) 
Northeast 69 (79.3%) 18 (20.7%) 
Southeast 15 (75.0%) 5 (25.0%) 
Southwest 28 (65.1%) 15 (34.9%) 
West 167 (88.4%) 22 (11.6%) 
South Atlantic 73 (76.8%) 21 (23.2%) 
Grand yotal 438 (83.1%) 89 (16.9%) 
Note. The four 9/11 attacks were excluded. 
Research Question 3 
RQ3: What was the relationship between the region of the terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type)? 
Weapon Used 
Similar to the previous analysis, data were too sparse to compare by city or state; 
therefore, I used region to analyze the differences in weapons used and target type across 
terrorist attacks. A chi-square analysis allowed me to compare region and the weapon 
used. The other category includes melee, vehicle, fake weapons, and sabotage equipment. 
The fatalities from the 9/11 attacks were excluded in the chi-square analysis. The results 
revealed a significant difference between region and weapon used, 2(15) = 67.422, p < 
.05.  
Post-hoc analyses revealed that the use of explosives/biological/chemical (37.9%) 
weapons was significantly higher in the Northeast than in other regions. In addition, the 
use of firearms was significantly higher in the Southeast (50.0%) and Southwest (51.2%), 
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compared to the other regions. In contrast, use of incendiary weapons was significantly 
lower in the Southwest (25.6%) and highest in Midwest (48.9%) in comparison to the 
other regions. Table 10 presents the frequency of weapon used by region. 
Table 10 
Weapon Used by Region 
State Explosives/ 
biological/chemical 
Firearms Incendiary Other  
Midwest 24 (25.5%) 13 (13.8%) 46 (48.9%) 11 (11.7%)  
Northeast 33 (37.9%) 17 (19.5%) 26 (29.9%) 11 (12.6%)  
Southeast 1 (5.0%) 10 (50.0%) 8 (40.0%) 1 (5.0%)  
Southwest 7 (16.3%) 22 (51.2%) 11 (25.6%) 3 (7.0%)  
West 32 (16.9%) 29 (15.3%) 109 (57.7%) 19 (10.1%)  
South Atlantic 29 (30.9%) 23 (24.5%) 34 (36.2%) 8 (8.5%)  
Grand total 123 (23.9%) 114 (21.6%) 234 (44.1%) 53 (10.1%)  
 
Target Type 
A chi-square analysis was the statistic used to compare region and the target type. 
The other category included journalist and media, utilities, transportation (including 
airports), tourists, unknown, nongovernmental organization, terrorists, and 
telecommunications. The results revealed a significant difference between region and the 
target type, 2(20) = 53.090, p < .05.  
Post-hoc analyses showed that targets for education/business were significantly 
higher in the West (37.0%) in comparison to other regions. In addition, 
police/military/government targets were significantly higher in South Atlantic (28.7%) 
and significantly lower in the Midwest (7.4%) and West (14.3%). Furthermore, targets 
for religious/abortion were significantly higher in the Southeast (45.0%). However, there 
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were no significant differences across regions for private and citizen & property and 
other target types (p > .05). Table 11 shows the frequency of target type by region. 
Table 11 












Midwest 19 (20.2%) 7 (7.4%) 30 (31.9%) 28 (29.8%) 10 (10.6%) 
Northeast 16 (18.4%) 21 (24.1%) 22 (25.3%) 17 (19.5%) 11 (12.6%) 
Southeast 3 (15.0%) 4 (20.0%) 3 (15.0%) 9 (45.0%) 1 (5.0%) 
Southwest 8 (18.6%) 10 (23.3%) 11 (25.6%) 11 (25.6%) 3 (7.0%) 
West 70 (37.0%) 27 (14.3%) 47 (24.9%) 37 (19.6%) 8 (4.2%) 
South Atlantic 13 (13.8%) 27 (28.7%) 21 (22.3%) 23 (24.5%) 10 (10.6%) 
Grand total 129 (24.5%) 96 (18.2%) 134 (25.4%) 125 (23.7%) 43 (8.2%) 
 
Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. Findings showed 
that trends in terrorist attacks for injuries did not differ across time. However, trends in 
terrorist attacks for fatalities decreased significantly over time. Excluding the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the majority of attacks occurred in the West, followed by the Midwest, 
South Atlantic, Northeast, Southwest, and Southeast regions. Significant differences in 
the number of injuries appeared across regions, with terrorist attacks in the Southwest and 
Northeast regions having significantly more injuries than the other regions. However, 
116 
 
there were significant differences in fatalities by region. Specifically, terrorist attacks in 
the Southwest had significantly more fatalities (34.9%) than in the other regions.  
In addition, the weapon used differed across region. Specifically, explosives/ 
biological/chemical weapons were significantly higher in the Northeast. The use of 
incendiary weapons in terrorist attacks was significantly less associated with the 
Southwest but significantly more associated with attacks in the Midwest. For the 
Southeast and Southwest, terrorist attacks were more highly associated with firearm use.  
Last, for target type, education/business targets were significantly more associated 
with states in the West. In contrast, police/military/government targets were significantly 
higher in the South Atlantic and significantly lower in the Midwest and West. In addition, 
religious/abortion targets were significantly higher in the Southeast. There were no 
significant differences across regions for private and citizen & property and other types. 
Chapter 5 presents a detailed summary of the findings, contributions of this study, 
theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future directions. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The problem addressed in this study was that local officials are only modestly 
confident that their local communities and governments are prepared to adequately 
respond to a terrorist event based on analysis of multiple factors (Brandeau, 2019; David 
& Le Dévédec, 2018; Scott & Errett, 2018; Welby-Everard et al., 2020). Research has 
shown that the public is not properly prepared for terrorism, and the health care 
community lacks knowledge and the capacity for an effective response to a terrorist 
attack (Eto & Kanatani, 2018; Funk, 2018). Existing research has focused on state and 
federal levels of preparedness and not those at the local level (Grundmann, 2014). 
Currently, stakeholders do not consider terrorism a major threat, thereby limiting 
preparedness. Some government officials have deemed preparations for terrorist threats 
too expensive or complicated (Green et al., 2019; Tournier et al., 2019). Due to limited 
resources, government officials have examined terrorism through the lens of its potential 
impact as well as its likelihood of occurrence (Banerjee et al., 2017; Ryan, 2016). This is 
especially true at the CDC and county levels, where resources and funding are tight, 
leading to a lack of preparedness for terrorism (Zacchia & Schmitt, 2018). 
The purpose of this quantitative descriptive study was to examine trends in 
terrorism attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018 and determine whether any 
statistical significance existed between the characteristics of the terrorism incidents 
(weapon used and target type) and the region in which they occurred. Due to limitations 
of the sample size, I examined differences across regions. The research questions for this 
study were:  
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RQ1: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States? 
RQ2: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States by region? 
RQ3: What was the relationship between the region of the terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type)? 
The purpose of terrorism is to cause terror and panic in target populations (Barras 
& Greub, 2014). Although it is more statistically relevant to fear car accidents, people 
fear terrorism incidents in which they have no control. To combat terrorism, government 
agencies such as public health, national defense, security, and public relations must 
coordinate and be well prepared. Each of these teams should have their own plans and 
collaborate to ensure their communities are safe and organized for when a terrorist attack 
occurs (Bilala & Galamas, 2015; Pinto, 2013). An essential type of preparedness is in the 
medical field. It is vital that the health care community is aware and prepared for a 
terrorist event to manage the victims’ health care needs. (Pinto, 2013; Tegos, 2013). 
Even before September 11, 2001, the threat of a terrorist attack remained remote. 
However, there was an increased focus on terrorism after anthrax incidents and the rise of 
domestic terrorism (SteelFisher et al., 2012; Sun & Yang, 2017). Those committing these 




Preparedness is a comprehensive and vital concept that can include 
communication, infrastructure, education, and response (Arrazola et al., 2018; Manuell & 
Cukor, 2010; Poutanen, 2007; Smith & Davison, 2010; Waterer & Robertson, 2009). 
Two of the most important components of withstanding a terrorist attack are lockdowns 
and evacuation. However, there have been questions about whether a community is 
prepared enough for an attack. Ten percent of nurses in North Texas felt adequately 
prepared in case of an attack, 30% believed they needed to increase their collaboration 
with state and federal agencies, and 69% stated they still needed more training (Jacobson 
et al., 2010). These results are comparable to the awareness of the general public.  
Scholars are concerned that the majority of the U.S. population cannot discern a 
terrorist attack from a regular attack (Etchegary et al., 2008). This lack of differentiation 
creates a murky perception in the public that leads to poor risk assessment and 
communication. Other scholars noted that while public health professionals must know 
what terrorism is, it is also essential to have uniform definitions of preparedness. In other 
forms of attacks, preparedness can prevent the incident or limit the number of casualties. 
Based on the lack of literature, it appears that the public lacks preparedness for a 
terrorist threat. The public lacks education, preparedness, and awareness, while the health 
care community is without the necessary knowledge and ability for a quick and accurate 
response. Researchers showed that stakeholders, such as community leaders, do not think 
of themselves as prone to such an attack (Bilala & Galamas, 2015; Green et al., 2019; 
Pinto, 2013; Tournier et al., 2019). Therefore, resources devoted to a terrorist attack are 
minimal, and any plans developed lack depth. Thus, this study is significant in 
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highlighting the awareness of terrorism incidents between 2001 and 2018. Future 
planners can incorporate this uncovered knowledge about terrorist incidents. The study 
also showed trends and characteristics based on the region where attacks occurred within 
the selected time frame. 
The results of this study were that injuries from terrorist attacks did not differ 
across time however terrorist attacks. Fatalities decreased significantly over time. In 
terms of region, the most attacks occurred in the West, followed by the Southeast, 
Northwest, and Midwest; the fewest occurred in the Southwest. The Southeast and 
Southwest saw the most injuries, while the Northeast, Midwest, and Western regions had 
fewer injuries. These figures differ from the number of fatalities regionally. Weapon 
types also differed across region. Explosive, biological, chemical weapons were higher in 
the Northeast, while incendiary weapons were more common in the West. Guns and 
firearms were used most in the Southeast and Southwest. Educational and business 
targets were more associated with states in the West, as well. In contrast, police, military, 
and government targets were higher in the Southeast. There were no differences between 
private property, religious, and abortion target types. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Research Question 1 
RQ1: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States?  
I used time-series analysis to assess if there were trends in the number of injuries 
and fatalities in terrorist attacks from 2001 to 2018. The injuries time-series data set 
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indicated that time was a significant predictor of injuries associated with terror activities 
(β = -0.513, p = 0.001), and fatalities was statistically significant (β = -0.51, p = 0.001), 
suggesting a downward trend in injuries and fatalities likely to occur during terrorist 
attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018. Consequently, the first alternative 
hypothesis—There were changes in terrorist attacks (number of incidents, injuries, and 
fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States—was accepted. 
To properly frame the statistics, it is important to note that the United States has 
the lowest number of fatalities globally as of 2007 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Before 
September 11, 2001, there was a decline in fatal attacks of terrorism, with only 580 
compared to 832 in 1979. This means that terrorist attacks were the lowest they have 
been in 20 years. However, fatal attacks have since considerably increased to the point 
that, in 2007, they were back to the peak of 1992 (LaFree, 2010). The United States is a 
perceived target of many terrorist attacks; however, these data were mainly based upon 
attacks on Americans on foreign soil, not taking into account the terror that could occur 
domestically. It is important to note that a single event accounts for the majority of 
fatalities within the United States between 1970 and 2007: the 9/11 World Trade Center 
attack. Before this incident, the U.S. fatality rate was closer to Canada and Greece.  
Most terrorist attacks and fatalities are directed against non-U.S. targets, as it is 
easier to strike foreign lands (LaFree, 2010). This aligns with the idea that the decisions 
of anti-U.S. terrorist groups for domestic terrorism remain deliberate. Fatal attacks often 
occur for ideological reasons to invoke specific emotions of the target audience of the 
terrorist organizations. Fatalities in the United States often occur if domestic challengers 
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cannot succeed,  thus expanding the geographical area of attack. When attacks are fatal, 
they influence American policies.  
Silva et al. (2020) utilized the Extremist Crime Database and global terrorism 
base to demystify terrorism in the United States. The authors examined jihadist-inspired, 
far-right, and far-left terrorist attacks to understand the phenomenon within the last 
century. The researchers found that incidents, fatalities, and injuries are increasing. They 
are being committed internationally and are jihadist extremists, usually of Arab descent 
and working in organized groups. However, when examining domestic terrorism, the 
attackers are often White, far-right extremists who act alone. 
The downward trend of injuries and fatalities between 2001 and 2018 suggests 
that the United States could comply with the different aspects of risk management 
stipulated in Grundmann’s (2014) model. The lessening number of injuries and fatalities 
indicates that proper risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication are in 
place and appropriately implemented following a terrorist attack. The 9/11 attack was a 
surprise, which led to a large number of injuries and fatalities. However, although several 
terrorist attacks have happened after that, the injuries and fatalities recorded were few, 
which may indicate proper risk management on the part of the United States.  
Research Question 2 
RQ2: What were the trends in terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2018 (number of 
incidents, injuries, and fatalities) in the United States by region? 
There were 531 terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2018, 
resulting in 23,686 injuries and 3,368 fatalities. The West had the greatest number of 
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attacks (35.5%), followed by the Midwest and the South Atlantic (17.8%). Therefore, the 
second alternative hypothesis is accepted: There were changes in terrorist attacks 
(number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities) between 2001 and 2018 in the United States 
by region. 
Regardless of where the terroristic attack occurs, preparation is crucial at the 
local, regional, state, and national levels (Armstrong, 2012; Baldassare & Hoene, 2003; 
Donahue et al., 2013; Maor, 2010; Nilsson, 2010; Putzer, 2006; Zogby, 2012). Public 
perception is a key component of preparedness. However, the public is only 3% confident 
of federal officials, 16% of state officials, and 58% of local and regional officials in 
protecting them from a terrorist attack, demonstrating that the more local response, the 
safer the populace feels (Zogby, 2012).  
Donahue et al. (2013) sought to determine if there was a link between individual 
perceptions of preparedness and a correlation with public officials’ perceptions of 
preparedness. The author surveyed individuals and public decision-makers from four 
regions and 11 public officials in each region. Participants reported on their level of 
preparedness, what they had done to prepare, why they had or had not prepared, what 
their level of concern was, the ability to recover from the event, the likelihood of that 
event occurring, the likelihood of disaster, the advocacy prepared to spending, the degree 
to which residents were prepared, why residents did not prepare, on whom residents will 
rely in a disaster, how informed the residents actually were, and whether residents follow 
directions during a state of emergency. 
124 
 
Donahue et al. (2013) found that public officials are more able and prepared than 
private citizens when coping with disasters such as terrorist threats. However, in terms of 
crisis management, local elected officials tended to see natural disasters of biggest risk 
while citizens felt that terrorism was a greater threat. No matter the region, public 
officials were surprised when residents announced that they would be eager to follow 
government instructions at the regional level. Citizens and local governments did not feel 
a need to rely on state and federal agencies. Ultimately, however, Donahue found that the 
responses between citizens and public officials remained different. 
Another difficulty involving regional acts of terrorism is the lack of resources at 
the local level. These differences often cause local governments to rely on each other 
rather than just state or federal agencies (Canós & Piedrahita, 2017). Regions of limited 
resources, especially rural areas, have found it better to share authority and resources 
during an emergency. However, sharing can result in misunderstandings. Therefore, there 
should be a strong architecture for community response planning to address this problem 
(Canós & Piedrahita, 2017).  
Local preparedness is especially important regarding a terrorist attack, as stressed 
in Grundmann’s (2014) model of risk management. Many cities took their biggest step 
toward combating terrorism and terrorism preparedness post-9/11 (Medina, 2016). Cities 
combined risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, which are all 
aspects of Grundmann’s model, resulting in a better response to terrorist attacks. 
However, security differs significantly across regions. While city officials are concerned 
about homeland security issues, such as biological and chemical attacks and 
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cyberterrorism, most of their focus is on crime and economic issues. Baldassare and 
Hoene (2003) found that only 50% of officials were concerned about attacks. Florida and 
Texas were at 56% and 54%, respectively, much lower than the North or East at 72%. 
Lastly, officials in Western cities were the least likely to have cooperation levels with 
federal agencies compared to the Northeast and Midwest. 
Research Question 3 
RQ3: What was the relationship between the region of the terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type)?  
Data analysis indicated a significant difference between region and weapon type. 
Explosive/biological/chemical weapons were higher in the Northeast, whereas incendiary 
weapons was lower in the Southeast compared to other regions. Firearms was 
significantly higher in the West and Southwest compared to other regions; incendiary 
weapons were highest in the West. There was also a significant relationship between 
target type and regional area. Therefore, the third alternative hypothesis—There was a 
statistically significant relationship between the region of terrorist attack and the 
characteristics of the terrorist attack (independent/predictor variables: weapon used and 
target type) for one or more regions and one or more characteristic of terrorist attack—
was accepted. Target types, including educational institutions and businesses, was higher 
in the West, while police, military, and government targets were higher in the West and 
South Atlantic. Attacks on private property and religious/abortion targets were higher in 
the West and Midwest and lowest in the Southeast. The literature review did not provide 
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information about targets or weapon types, thereby creating an opportunity for future 
research. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were numerous limitations to the study, including methodology, available 
data, and data omission. The study was limited to the available secondary data. There was 
no account for personal, firsthand perspectives on the subject of terrorism. Utilizing a 
qualitative methodology would have allowed for interviews with experts to provide 
greater insight into the phenomenon. Additionally, using a qualitative approach could 
have answered questions of how or why these terrorist attacks occur. 
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the study was the data set. I used only publicly 
available data, which indicated when, where, and the type of weapons used in terrorist 
attacks in the United States. Other details about the terrorism or effect of terrorism, such 
as the type of attack, residency status of attackers, and economic impact, were 
unavailable and limited the analysis in this study. 
Recommendations 
This study created recommendations for further research and positive social 
change. Future researchers should expand the view of terrorism to include the entire 
globe. Because there have been limited terrorist attacks within the United States, it was 
difficult to obtain a comprehensive view of events. Including other countries could better 
illuminate preparedness and the results of such incidences. Terrorism is a threat, and it 
does occur internationally; therefore, an extensive look at terrorism on a global scale 
could provide significantly more knowledge of the phenomenon. 
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Additionally, future scholars could expand this study to include terrorist attacks 
that occurred on foreign soil. Before domestic terrorism occurs within the United States, 
terrorists try to attack targets closer to them, such as embassies and State Departments. 
Understanding broader terrorist trends against the United States could offer insight into 
when domestic terrorism occurs and why. 
Another recommendation for future research would be to repeat the study using a 
qualitative approach. The researcher could interview experts, policymakers, and officials 
at the forefront of terrorism and preparedness. These officials could be at the local, 
regional, state, or federal levels. Understanding their perceptions of terrorism would 
provide further insight into the phenomenon. 
The data analyzed in this study excluded the terrorist event of September 11, 
2001. This attack yielded the most significant number of fatalities within the United 
States. Removing this statistic could provide better insight into the trends of the 
phenomenon, especially among fatalities and injuries.  
Another recommendation for future research would be to investigate who the 
attackers are. This study did not distinguish international from national terrorists or left-
wing from right-wing terrorists. Understanding what the trends are among types of 
terrorists can provide better insight into the phenomena. Identifying the perpetrators of 
domestic terrorist attacks versus international terrorist attacks could provide 
policymakers with recommendations for practice and preparation. Additional information 
would come from examining the weapons used for each type of attack. 
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Positive Social Change 
The study also has implications for positive social change. Through time-series 
analysis, answering RQ showed no relationship between injuries and time, but there is 
one between fatalities and time. Since 9/11, there has been greater protection against 
domestic terrorist threats. Therefore, government officials should continue to use all tools 
available to help prevent domestic terrorist threats and continue reducing fatalities. 
The results of RQ2 showed that the greatest number of attacks occurred in the 
West, followed by the Southeast, Northeast, Midwest, and Southwest. These statistics 
could be useful to guide national intelligence on where the next threat will likely be as it 
is important to understand where the high-profile targets are. Targets could include theme 
parks, government buildings, media centers, or abortion clinics. By focusing on where 
terrorist attacks are most likely to occur, government officials can distribute resources to 
help combat domestic terrorism. 
Policymakers can also use the results of RQ3 to improve preparedness. 
Explosives/biological/chemical weapons use was higher in the Northeast, while firearms 
were significantly more common in the Southeast and Southwest. Last, incendiary 
weapons were highest in the West. Utilizing these statistics, policymakers at the local, 
regional, state, and federal levels could better understand what types of weapons terrorists 
will use and where. The study also showed that education institutes and businesses were 
targeted significantly higher in the West, while police, military, and government targets 
were higher in the Southeast. These results can help policymakers identify the next target 
129 
 
for domestic terrorism. By utilizing these results, policymakers can improve their 
preparedness, reducing injuries and death. 
Conclusion 
The problem addressed was that local officials are only modestly confident that 
their local communities and governments are prepared to adequately respond to a terrorist 
event based on analysis of multiple factors (Brandeau, 2019; David & Le Dévédec, 2018; 
Scott & Errett, 2018; Welby-Everard et al., 2020). The purpose of this quantitative 
descriptive study was to examine trends in terrorism attacks in the United States between 
2001 and 2018 and determine whether any statistical significance existed between the 
characteristics of the terrorism incidents (weapon used and target type) and the region in 
which they occurred. Due to the limitations of the sample, I examined differences across 
regions. This study was significant because there was a lack of data on terrorism 
incidents regarding fatalities and injuries, region, weapon type, and target. Findings 
showed that trends in terrorist attacks for injuries did not differ across time. However, 
trends in terrorist attacks for fatalities decreased significantly over time. The majority of 
attacks occurred in the West, followed by the Southeast, Northeast, and Midwest, with 
the lowest number of attacks occurring in Southwest states.  
In addition, the weapon type differed across region. Specifically, explosives/ 
biological/chemical weapons were significantly higher in the Northeast. In contrast, the 
use of incendiary weapons in terrorist attacks was significantly less associated with the 
Northeast but significantly more associated with the West. For the Southeast and 
Southwest, terrorist attacks were more highly associated with firearm use. Finally, for 
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target type, education/business targets were significantly more associated with states in 
the West, while police/military/government targets were significantly higher in the 
Southeast and lower in the Midwest and West. One recommendation is for future 
researchers to use different data sets to better understand the phenomenon. Also, 
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